

The Culture of Polis

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МИГРАТСКЕ КРИЗЕ, СТАЊЕ,
ПЕРСПЕКТИВЕ, РИЗИЦИ**

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часопис за неговање демократске политичке културе

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MIGRANT CRISIS AS A THREAT TO THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Summary: By analyzing migration through a conflictual paradigm, the author explores its potential terrorist framework, concentrating on the Balkan route and the role of Serbia and its security services in their prevention. Slow, but more evident changes in the ethnic, religious and cultural structure of the European Union's population are causing a change in the security paradigm, which here will be clarified in detail.

The theoretical definition of the migrant crisis as a more permanent and larger event with potentially negative consequences affecting the recipient countries, as well as their public, indicates their conflict and insufficiently deep integration, which creates a fertile ground for new conflicts. Time compression and information-communication dissemination of terrorist activities increases the number of highly-stressed situations, which requires a precise, fast and adequate response from crisis management. At the center of scientific attention, there is a collision of national (especially religious) identities, creating a possible security disorder that affects the state, but in the long run it endangers the fundamental assumptions, self-identity and essence of the European Union.

Key words: Migrants, Identities, Terrorism, Religions, Conflicts, Security

Crises and conflicts are deeply embedded in the security fabric of contemporary society, but with unpredictable and hardly controlled movements of the population (migrations) in the last few years they create a specific social vulnerability that can only be seen through careful analysis from multiple security angles. The change in the paradigm is evident: if in the 20th century economic motives were triggers for the temporary or permanent migration of the population, at the present time we can talk about armed conflicts imposed by the United States and its allies, who by organizing, supporting and realizing numerous pseudo "revolutions" have created the reasons for a civilized unplanned growth of forced migration. Everything started with the "Arab Spring" (2011), since thereafter a refugee column from the wider Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Yemen), North and Central Africa (Libya, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria) and central South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh)

headed towards Europe in eight directions, including the so-called Balkan route.¹ The world's public slowly spotted the depth of the problem, even when statistics began to warn of tectonic disturbances in the changing structure of the population: in 2013, the number of refugees on the planet reached 214 million, over the next year there were 30 million more, in at the end 2015 crossed a quarter billion? An enormous number of unhappy people went to Europe, destroying the national borders and changing the demographic structure of the countries in which they began to emerge, but together with them there was a rapid change in the religious, cultural and security spheres.² In collision with the intentions of a large number of Muslim populations to emigrate and the restrictive migration policies of a part of European countries, a process of smuggling of people has developed, thus further expanding one of the most cost-effective forms of transnational organized crime. Hence the migrant crisis poses a major challenge to crisis management, because the unpredictability and escalation of various forms of social crises and conflicts, with the growth of terrorist activities, require an adequate, theoretically precise answer, including the study of causes, elements, dynamics, outcomes and further conflictual perspectives, which was the focus of this paper.

We can notice the roots of the current crises even during the adoption of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees in 1951. Then, contrary to the practice created after the Second World War when most displaced persons were taken care of by international agencies, rapid integration of refugees in the receiving countries was required. Thus, the seemingly humane idea of allowing people who have been provided with protection from persecution to support themselves and their families in their work in the host country, is reversed in the obligation to act in such a way that it was never counted that the number of such cases would begin rapidly to increase over time, threatening to fail to fulfill program documents. Obtaining refugee status, in addition to the normative protection against political persecution, had the goal of providing these people with autonomy, including the economic and security sphere, which would benefit recipients from working-minded migrants. This means that the current ideas about the construction of large refugee camps in which millions of desperate people would be taken care of with the help of European money are not in line with the basic concept of the Geneva Convention? On the contrary, in ethnically-religiously complex states this kind of treatment of refugees in the long run leads to conflicts, because it makes them dependent on the assistance, without providing integration into the new community. In addition, the resistance in some states to accept the quotas of refugees increases over time, in order to distribute the

¹ Security analysts singled out the following routes: the West-Mediterranean route (which goes from the Maghreb countries to Spain and France); West-African route; Central-Mediterranean route (from the Libyan and Tunisian coasts to the Apennine Peninsula); Routes through Apulia and Calabria; (From Greece, via Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary and Croatia), the east-Mediterranean route (overseas routes from Levant to the Greek islands, and then to the Balkans), and (the most used) route through the eastern borders (through the post-Soviet Space to the central EU countries).

² In the world's population, only 3.3% of the population are migrants, but in Europe at present they are more than 10%. For example, Germany compared to only two last years has almost 10 million new Muslims of Islamic origin, France close to eight, Spain over six million, with an evident increase in xenophobia in most EU countries!

burden as evenly as possible, with the view that the poorer countries take more burden from the rich!³ In other words, the growth of migrations and the pressure of new immigrants increase the possibility of conflict among the elderly and newly born population, while peace is maintained by political means, which is clearly recognized in theory. From the point of view of conflictology, one of the most common tactics in the circumstances of social crises, as well as the crisis of the legitimacy of power, is the creation of the so-called *displaced conflicts* (K. Deutsch). Then conflicts are expressed in symbolic or idiomatic form, and “the collapse of political control over them means revolution or war.”⁴

Resistance to the European Union’s policy towards a migrant crisis

Observing the processes of globalization through the interconnection of the population, we could conclude that migration is an integral part of it. For example, Kate Nash sees globalization through flows of goods, capital, people, information, ideas, images and risks beyond national borders.⁵ He interprets contemporary social movements in a fundamentally different way from the “old”, class-oriented, with the emphasis on the interests of society rather than the state. Through such an optic it is possible to understand the approval of EU member states that only during 2016 refugee status or some other form of protection is acquired by more than 700.000 people, mostly Syrians. EU statistics agency Eurostat acknowledged that the total number is more than twice as high compared to the previous year, with 405.600 Syrians surrendering, as many as 65.800 Iraqis and 61.800 Afghans. It should be naïve to assume that with the waves of Islamic refugees there will be no spread of religious radicalism or that there are no “sleepy” members of al-Qaeda or similar terrorist organizations in the word of newcomers.

In the beginning of this paper, we have a security system as a model of organizing and functioning of the state in the implementation of measures and activities on a preventive and repressive plan aimed at preserving the sovereignty and integrity of the state, constitutional order, rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as other social values from potential forms of endangerment. This means that “the state was and remains a necessity both to its citizens and to the international order”, whereby “the national state is irreplaceable in offering internal security, security, feelings of belonging and identity”.⁶ Hence, the solution to the problem of migrants in Europe is primarily advocated by Germany, which is logical if more than 70 percent of Syrians are known in its territory, but also that it has accepted the largest number of asylum

³ The Oxfam humanitarian organization announced that the US, China, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom hosted 2.1 million refugees, which is 8.8 percent of their total. At the same time, the poorest countries such as Jordan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Turkey and South Africa, as well as occupied Palestinian territories, are home to more than 50 percent of refugees, although together they make up less than two percent of the world economy?

⁴ Deutsch, K., (1970), *Social Mobilization and Political Development*, New York, p. 68.

⁵ Nash, Kate: *Savremena politička sociologija: globalizacija, politika i moć*, Službeni glasnik, Belgrade, 2006, p. 59.

⁶ Orlović, Slaviša: *Politički život Srbije, između partokratije i demokratije*, Službeni glasnik, Belgrade, 2008, p. 37-38.

seekers. The plan involves three fields: 1) the introduction of compulsory quota for refugee acceptance at the EU level; 2) stronger co-operation with Turkey, and 3) peace mediation in order to end the conflict in Syria.

Social conflicts are inextricably linked to social life, which means that in real life it is indeed necessary to create and spread contradictions among members of the community. If EU members do not have a single security policy, it is certain that the cracks in its implementation will suddenly escalate across a crisis situation. Since a part of the countries firmly refuses to introduce quotas or agrees to receive a negligible number of refugees, it is clear that the burden will have to be borne by some other states. For example, France refuses to receive more than a few tens of thousands of refugees annually, while the state's attitude is so called. Visegrad Group (Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland) is even more rigid. Poland, with 40 million inhabitants, has agreed to receive 400 refugees, while in Slovakia all political parties agree not to receive anyone.

There is a growing inconvenience to migrants in the European public. Only in Germany last year there were more than 3.500 attacks on refugees and shelters for asylum seekers, which means there were almost 10 attacks on average during the day, according to data from the German Ministry of the Interior. Within them, 560 people were injured, including 43 children, which is a characteristic of the intense phase of the conflict.⁷ The residents of the German city of Elvangen contacted the public in November 2015, stating that thousands of migrants who have recently arrived, are doing a lot of work in their yards, fighting in churches and stealing from local shops, while local police do everything to deal with Unrest. Different cultural values, religious orientations, levels of education, lifestyles, approaches to violence and hygiene produce possible differences in the perception of life, in which we can see the roots of potential conflicts. Muslim refugees are difficult and unwilling to integrate into the values of the domicile population, building their own ghettos in the middle of other countries, which favors the growth of right-wing organizations, but also religiously radicalized Islamism as the detonator of major crises or conflicts.

Crisis management has from the beginning perceived that subjects of social conflicts are two or more social groups that: "are in mutual contact; in which there is awareness of this touch, as well as awareness of the opposite of interest."⁸ Slowly, but all the more noticeable changes in the ethnic, religious and cultural structure of the European Union's population are causing a change in the security paradigm. Dissatisfied with the EU's core plan to leave the other countries on the periphery, the members of the Visegrad Group, who have been complaining for some time in Brus-

⁷ Milašinović and Kesetović, as a general characteristic of the intensified conflict phases, see that "communication is considerably limited, conflicting parties notice mostly what divides and separates them, and not what could be termed common, distrust grows among them, and solve problems (i.e. Conflicts) is not considered a common task." (Crisis Management, 2009, pp. 131-132).

⁸ Dahrendorf believes that social groups, if they do not have awareness of their position or if they consider it legitimate (for example, if they correspond to the religious system they accept), conflicts occur relatively rarely. However, only consciousness (the presence of ideology) of an unequal position, as well as the belief that this position can be changed by action, turns "quasi-groups" with latent interests into conflicting groups with manifest interests. More in: Dahrendorf R., (1989), *Homo Sociologikus*, Niš, p.47-65.

sels for raising a new iron curtain in Brussels - have decided to ignore the European Commission's decision to launch a process against them. In their explanation, they emphasize that they do not want to receive refugees and keep them in camps so that they do not go to Germany or other, richer EU member states later on. The Polish political leadership took the view that asylum policy is the responsibility of states and that people in the program of relocation are not refugees, but migrants who do not want to stay in Poland.

At the first moment, the Czech Republic received 12 migrants, but then the process of relocation was stopped. The political elite has expressed readiness to pay fines only to not receive migrants, announcing the possibility of leaving the EU if this is a way to preserve their country. Czechs and Poles, as the main argument for refusing relocation of Muslim refugees, see the issue of citizens' safety as they connect migrants with frequent terrorist attacks in the west of Europe. The Hungarian government has announced earlier that it will not give up upon any pressure from the European Commission, where the geopolitical country is a strategic gate of Europe, which is shown by the fact that the EU financed the raising of the border to the Serbian border from its funds. Bulgaria rammed the entire length of the border to Turkey, and patrol dogs were deployed due to which it earned another "criticism" in the Western media. The response to the texts that said "Bulgaria welcomes migrants by letting dogs on them", was that "dogs are part of a regular border control system". Due to the slow reaction of the state, a part of the dissatisfied citizens self-organized themselves, taking the problem solving into their own hands, setting up on the border of civilian guards that constantly monitors migrants. It describes their mission about a thousand members of this paramilitary formation as a defense of Christian Bulgaria and Europe from "barbarians, extreme Muslims".

Tension at the borders points to the high potential of the crisis and the low priority of crisis management, while occasional ecstasies in the interior of the states that have opened their premises point to disorder and uncertainty, which are the characteristics of crisis situations. At a first glance, the existence of crisis potential can be perceived, so the solution should be sought in the unification and alignment of a whole range of security and material and technical resources that need not be visible to the general public. Crises occur in a number of manifestations, so the plan for solving them must not always be known. If the researchers find that "Hungary is firmly established to keep migrants out of its borders; Bulgaria has built 33 km long and 3 meters high fence at the border with Turkey, from barbed wire, which is overseen by thousands of police officers; barbed wire and four feet high fence separates Greece from Turkey; Spanish fences to the northeast enclaves were designed to prevent the entry of migrants to Seol and Melilla; United Kingdom has three kilometers of security fence to the tunnel passage of Port of Kale ... Denmark announces reduction of asylum fees; The French police prevented the entry of migrants from Ventimil etc."⁹ we can talk about a joint appearance in controlling and monitoring the entry into the EU.

⁹ Kern, S.: *Velika evropska migraciona kriza*, available at: <http://www.nspm.rs/savreme-ni-svet/velika-evropska-migraciona-kriza.html> (accessed on June 20, 2017).

Refugees are not welcome either in Austria, and the reason is the fear of religiously motivated Islamic extremism and terrorism. The real fear of the so-called provoked conflicts is testimony and a growing fear of terrorist actions in the UK, Belgium, France and other countries that were places of activity. However, there are erroneous claims that the number of actions today is greater than before, as statistics say differently: between 1970 and 1990 there was an unwritten rule that hundreds of attacks on an annual level would be carried out. At that time, terrorism was politically motivated and targeted at individuals: politicians, possibly industrialists or well-known public figures. Today's terrorism is intercontinental, religious, suicidal and media paralyzing. Unlike just a few decades ago, social networking and multimedia platforms now disperse fearlessly, embracing it in the depths of the psyche of lonely individuals. Theorists note that "the growth of terrorist activities will weaken the ideas of multiculturalism, which will further lead to the deepening of internal, religious, ethnic and inter-class differences, threatening the spread of crisis situations or potential conflicts."¹⁰

Although German right-wing movements, with the support of international media, emphasize that Chancellor Angela Merkel leads a liberal migrant policy, the shadows reveal the contours of a sharper and more rigorous policy of deporting those who have not received asylum. Thus, the government adopted a program for stimulating asylum seekers, while the Federal Migration and Refugees Service (FMRS), in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration, allocated around 40 million euros for these purposes. Whether this is not a short episode, but also a long-term strategy is also the official figure: in 2016, some 55.000 people voluntarily returned to their homelands, almost half more than a year earlier, when about 35.000 people returned.¹¹ The "targets" of this program are mostly citizens of African countries, but also of many Middle Eastern countries, including most Afghans. The decision of the richest European state to solve refugee drama by peaceful means shows a plan to spend more than 21 billion euros for this purpose this year! In the spirit of such aspirations, it is worth considering the proposal of Malta, which at the end of its transition to the European Union (June 2017) proposed that each member receive 60.000 euros for each asylum seeker who receives him through the allocated quota or pay the same amount if the determined quota is not fulfilled. The European Union still does not have a generally accepted solution to the migrant crisis, because it needs additional labor force due to aging of the population. Right-wing parties, with the quiet support of the Visegrad Group members, propose that male asylum seekers return their forces to the areas from which they came in, which is contrary to international law. The second plan, which is not officially spoken, is based on the assumption that countries through which refugees are actually

¹⁰Jevtović, Z. & Aracki Z.: „Serbia between Humanity and (Un)Security“, u: *The Migrant Crisis: European Perspectives and National Discourses*, July 2017, p. 251-266.

¹¹ Germany financially solves the problem of over-migrants, especially those who will not benefit from it. Every newcomer who is 12 years old gets 1.200 euros if he withdraws his request and voluntarily leaves Germany. Those who have been rejected have been offered 800 euros if they do not appeal to this court and go voluntarily. Families of five or more members on a basic sum are offered an additional 500 euros for each family member, including children under the age of 12.

passing through are safe third countries, who will not return them where their lives are in danger. According to this scenario, migrants should be kept in Turkey, but also in Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and other countries on their way. Faced with the fact that these countries are unable to receive hundreds of thousands of new refugees, the advocates of this approach underline that the EU should provide additional resources for the construction and maintenance of large camps in which migrants will be provided with decent existence until the conditions for their return to their country of origin. A large number of indicators that can be used for early detection, i.e. prediction of the dynamics, intensity and escalation of wider ethnic, religious and social conflicts, also indicate a change in the behavior of actors on the public scene, especially through the phase of strengthening resistance and unity in the EU member states' policies. When German sociologist Ulrich Beck argues that the modern community is a "risk society" and "manufactured uncertainty", he thinks that the devastating potential of the crisis is increasing with the growing awareness of citizens that the danger in their environment is growing each and every time.¹²

Migration and experiences of Serbia

Although the *Balkan route* does not formally function, statistics show that between 6.500 and 8.000 migrants, mostly from Afghanistan and Pakistan, habited daily in Serbia, while there is a significantly smaller number from Syria, Morocco, Algeria or directly conflict areas. It is realistic to assume that the final figure is significantly higher because a part of the refugees does not want to be registered in our country in order to surrender their asylum request to one of the richer European countries, while the number of refugees who are hiding in the houses and shelters of smugglers lurks a moment of neglect to reach the desired destination by illegal channels.¹³ Based on previous experience and assessment of the future course of events, migration will be a security challenge for the Republic of Serbia in the following period, with a real possibility of violating security, in the form of decreasing or increasing intensity of influx, which depends on international actors in finding a solution to the crisis. In Syria, as well as the measures that the European Union will take in the direction of further migration policies towards this territory.¹⁴ It should also be remembered that in Serbia at present there are 29.415 people who have refugee status from civil wars on the territory of the former SFR Yugoslavia. Since 1991, this status has had 618.000 people, so it can be seen how much effort the states have invested in providing them with accommodation and some form of economic security. The humanitarian and security approach towards migrants and

¹² See in: Beck, U. : *Rizično društvo*, Filip Višnjić, Belgrade, 2011.

¹³ Vladimir Cucić, the Commissioner for Refugees and Migration, said that "between 10 and 30 migrants enter Serbia daily on a regular basis, an average of 800 in a month, and again, 10 people regularly go through the gates of Horgos and Kelebija in line with the lists that exist ." The senior state official did not explain where there are 500 migrants of difference, that is, is their number increased in Serbia or are they going to richer countries of the EU through smuggling channels?

¹⁴ Jevtović, Z. And Bajić, P., „Migrantska kriza u ogledalu srpske dnevne štampe“, *Kultura Polisa*, 2016, p. 29-43.

refugees highlight the role of state institutions and services, but also the interests of the domicile population. A survey conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in May 2016 shows that almost half of the respondents have not developed a security relationship with the migrant issue,¹⁵ but also that almost four fifths (79%) of respondents believe that even more migrants can be expected in the future. This means that the vast majority of Serbian citizens think that the migrant issue is not closed, which can facilitate communication with regard to security issues related to the migrant crisis.

Resistance to migrants arises from several characteristic stereotypes, among which the most prominent is that migrants pose a risk to the health and physical safety of people. Next comes the explanation for allegedly endangering Serbian national interests in case of massive influx of migrants. Finally, the common argument concerns the endangerment of the way of life, that is, the local culture in case of mass migration of migrants, who thus change the patterns of life. In the conflict analysis, it is important to notice the way in which the citizens' dominant opinion on the migrant crisis is formed. In this research, led by professor Vladimir Vuletić, "the two-thirds majority of respondents believe that the opinions of spouses, friends, the Government or various domestic and international NGOs are not influenced to form their attitudes. Interestingly, in this regard, the media influence is the only one that most citizens say is somewhat, significantly or decisively influencing their opinion."¹⁶ It is therefore clear that communication in relation to the migrant issue must be mediated through the media. However, researchers point out that when reporting on the migrant crisis, our media are going in the extreme, forming "two dominant discourses, one of which is xenophobic, as it fills the story of Islamophobia, while the other dominates the thesis on humanitarian disaster and respect, or human rights violations."¹⁷ The media lack analytical texts, and the cacophony of attitudes about the migrant issue and sensationalistic reporting, which has the function of awakening both positive and negative emotions towards migrants, causes significant confusion in the attitudes of citizens towards the whole issue of the migrant crisis.

Observing the migrant route through the Balkans, we could conclude that the territory of the Republic of Serbia has a very unfavorable position because it is located in the central part of the movement of refugees towards their targeted destinations. As we have already had the opportunity to see, this means that in extreme situations, the borders of the surrounding states can quickly be closed, although this leads to the threat of free trade and the flow of goods, including the blockade of traffic (the case with Croatia and Hungary). Such procedures increase the security problems, but the security of the citizens and the territory of the Republic of Serbia is significantly endangered. The military-political aspect of the events in the Middle

¹⁵ The survey was conducted in the territory of Serbia without Kosovo. Older persons were surveyed in 115 settlements. The sample was multipath, stratified with a proportional share of the region. A total of thirty interviews were conducted with respondents from Belgrade, Subotica, Sida, Dimitrovgrad, Bujanovac, Preševo, Vranje and other places where refugees were accommodated.

¹⁶ „Studija o izbeglicama“, (Vladimir Vuletić, et al.), Fondacija Fridrih Ebert, Grafolik, Belgrade, 2016.

¹⁷ Aracki, Z. (2016). Medijski diskurs izbeglištva, Kultura Polisa, year XIII, No. 31., Novi Sad & Belgrade: Kultura-Polis, Institute for European Studies.

East does not indicate that a long-lasting solution is in sight, posing a threat and real threat to the new wave of migrants.

From the perspective of crisis situations, the biggest problem would be the accumulation of migrants who could remain “captured” for a longer period of time in the territory of the Republic of Serbia. In the long run, this could lead to the rise of security threats, especially in terms of possible incidents of migrants and the local population with much greater consequences than earlier. At the same time, our state is facing the lack of resources, EU logistical assistance and the lack of a long-term strategy to combat this problem. In addition, it is to be expected that the migrant crisis will continue to develop because it is one of the most redundant types of organized crime that generates huge incomes for criminal groups of smugglers. One recent Europol-Interpol report states that more than 90% of EU refugees and migrants are trafficked by smugglers who work for criminal networks. It is estimated that the annual profit from trafficking and human trafficking reaches up to 5-6 billion US dollars. Europol also points out that criminals have tripled their prices due to the reduced number of refugees and migrants who embark on this dangerous trip. Hence, it is not surprising that from the direction of Bulgaria, Macedonia and Montenegro, on average, 81 migrants try to enter daily in Serbia, and given the large number of migrants in Greece and Turkey, as well as the improvement of weather conditions, we can expect new pressure on the borders of Serbia.¹⁸ The joint forces of the army and the police provide 360 kilometers of the border with Bulgaria, 104 kilometers with Macedonia and 96 kilometers with Montenegro. The most frequent directions of attempts at illegal entry of migrants are near the main communications that lead from the territory of Macedonia and Bulgaria to Serbia. These are Skopje - Kumanovo - Preševo - Vranje, Sofia - Dimitrovgrad - Pirot and Vidin - Kula - Zaječar.

An additional risk could be the fact that among the migrants there could be a number of militant Islamists and terrorists, who were close to the “Islamic state”. Although no more ecstasy of this kind occurred in more than one million and a half of the crossings, it is impossible to exclude the possibility that it will happen, which is why the Republic of Serbia is ready for crisis operations, including raising walls at the borders.¹⁹ “It turned out that one of the terrorist attacks in Belgium a year ago passed through the Balkan route, and some of them now committing terrorist attacks, were born in the Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain, France, but it is very likely that if not current, some future “sleepers” are passing through the Balkan route,” said Vladimir Cucić, Refugee and Migration Commissioner.²⁰ The collision of national, especially religious identities is very possible, with Islamic terrorists aiming at the multicultural environment of the state and its role in the wider security framework.

¹⁸ During the illegal crossing in 2015, 36.598 migrants were caught, while in 2016 they were 6.050, while 25.056 were abandoned, after they realized they were noticed.

¹⁹ Website <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:631450-ALARMANTNI-PODACI-Srbiji-preti-milion-i-po-migranata>, accessed June 21, 2017.

²⁰ *Politika*, June 5, 2017, Belgrade.

Final considerations

By analyzing the scope, models and characteristics of current migrations to the European Union, we see that they are no longer an internal or international grouping and migration of population for existential reasons (economic migrants), but that the vast majority are refugees from conflict zones, politically persecuted asylum seekers and environmental migrants, as well as the persons with criminal records and terrorists are hiding among them. With the proliferation of the migratory process, security risks are increasingly increasing, recognizable through association with transnational organized smuggling, trafficking in human beings, crime and terrorism. Given the fact that modern migrations take on the features of globalization, organization and massiveness, it is clear that the risks and consequences of human, national and international security are multiplied. The German security services data show that migrants on a trip to European countries spend an average of \$ 7.100, points to the dimension of organized peoples of the population, which will change the demographic image of the old continent in the long run. From the perspective of conflictology and security sciences, the prolongation of migratory movements to such an extent threatens the security concept of the functional stability of the European Union, as the perception of risks among its citizens with every terrorist act is growing. "In a serious crisis situation, poor communication that does not take into account cultural or religious differences can greatly exacerbate the very crisis situation and result in the failure of crisis management," observed theorists.²¹ Along with institutional building, a model of common security is strengthened, but Member States' expectations are expected to be a matter of national responsibility. Simply said, at the level of the European Union, tools for the joint operation of national security services, which protect the values and functioning of the EU, are being developed, while the level of national security and stability is left at the lower level of regional integration (e.g., the Visegrad Group) or the countries themselves. In the event of a spread of a migrant crisis, terrorist actions or extreme forms of organized violence, all members are expected to be highly cooperative and cooperative.

Hence, we point to the importance of communication interaction, because fast and high-quality information exchange between the states allows for a tighter and more uniform security policy. We see the roots of such thinking in the very definition of the International Organization for Standardization (IOS) that sees risk communication as "sharing or sharing information about risks between decision makers and other stakeholders. This information may refer to the mere existence, nature, form, probability, degree of danger, acceptability, treatment or other aspects of risk situations."²² In our work, we see this phase as the central point of managing the migration crisis, because the lack of a uniform migration policy in European countries distinguishes the legal status of irregular migrants.

²¹ Kešetović; Tot: *Problemi kriznog menadžmenta*, Communications, 2012, p. 117.

²² „The Dimensions of Risk Communications“, *Governance, scientific advice, outreach and communication*, Stakeholders in Risk Communications, 2005., p. 5..

Serbia, as an important destination on the transit corridor, takes on an increasingly important role in the long term, becoming part of the solution to this problem, including the survival of a number of refugees, which will be financially supported by the EU at the first moment. However, it all points out that such detention will be temporary, since the ultimate goal of migrants remains Germany and richer members in the neighborhood. Empirical research shows that Serbian citizens do not see potentials and opportunities for development that can bring with them a long-term integration of migrants on their territory. This means that decision-makers in case of scenarios of residual number of refugees and migrants need to conduct a quality media campaign that will raise awareness of citizens and point out the positive effects that integration can have on the economy, culture and political opportunities, as well as on the overall quality of life of the domicile population. At the same time, Serbia should urge the EU to be included as soon as possible in the program of deportation of migrants to the countries of origin. It is absurd that the Serbian police prevent the migrants from crossing the Croatian and Hungarian border for 24 hours directly by protecting the interests of Europe without being included in the joint readmission program. Without the help of Europe, the accumulation of migrants will only continue, which will keep the problem uncompleted.

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