

PROACTIVE APPROACH OF POLICE IN COMBAT AGAINST FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM

Saša Milojević, PhD

Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade

Bojan Janković, MA

Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade

Abstract: Hooliganism of certain fans at football matches has been decades-old problem faced by many countries of the world. Our country is not an exception. Moreover, this kind of threat to security in our country shows the tendency of escalation. It is evident from our experience that solely repressive model for solving the football hooliganism does not provide satisfactory results. Analyzing the security methods of major football competitions held in many Western European countries, it can be concluded that the proactive police operations in confronting hooliganism at football matches are much more efficient and provide more acceptable results. The paper analyzes the experience of the police organizations of Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Germany acquired during the security of the European and the World Championship from the aspect of proactive police activity and generalization of experience on the ways of information collecting, processing and distribution on football hooliganism. In addition to this, the paper deals with the international police cooperation in order to share the intelligence databases on hooligans, primarily in the European Union; and it likewise provides guidelines on to which way our country's efforts should be directed in combat against hooliganism at football matches.

Key words: proactive approach, hooliganism at football matches, inter-police information exchange, fan violence, the European Union, the police

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Last year's incidents at the "Luigi Ferrari" stadium in Genoa, at the football match between the national teams of Italy and Serbia, caused by the Serbian hooligans, which resulted in interruption of the game and riots in the streets of the city, showed a few facts. First, Serbia still has a big problem with hooliganism; second, since it knows no borders, it is spread to other countries, often due to the cooperation of hooligans from different countries; third, a repressive approach of the Italian police has not proven to be adequate, and last, the omissions have come out in a proactive police actions of Italy and Serbia, which were reflected in the failure to achieve an adequate contact and intelligence sharing between the police of the two countries. Had a better link between the police been established and had they exchanged intelligence on hooligans, it would probably have reduced the likelihood of the emergence of violence in the stadium and the city itself.

From the very appearance of a problem with hooliganism, the police have generally applied the repressive measures in the fight against it, and therefore regularly suffered public criticism. Some police organizations, especially in the Southern and Eastern Europe and in Latin America, were characterized to use indiscriminate violence against the fans.¹ Police action on the problem of hooliganism has often

¹ Spaaij R., *The prevention of football hooliganism: a transnational perspective*, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research University of Amsterdam, <http://cafyd.com/HistDeporte/htm/pdf/4-16.pdf>, January, 09, 2011, page. 4.

seemed like a simple police response to a problem that suddenly appears. In contrast to this former police action, in recent years we have witnessed a rise in popularity of proactive police activity that is based primarily on intelligence work, but also on undertaking other measures before the escalation of problems.

Violence can be seen in virtually all sporting events, but it is most associated with football². National police units in the European Union, dealing with the problem of football hooliganism, more and more cooperate by exchanging intelligence information, especially in times when there is a big football event or on the occasion of the international matches. This concept of police work is likely to be extended to other countries because of the enlargement of the European Union, as well as the acceptance of this concept within the Football Associations that pay more and more attention to safety at football stadiums. Most experience in proactive actions can be seen in the British, Dutch, German and Belgian police units, which could serve as a model for other European countries. This style of police work seems to improve the strategy of combating football hooliganism to some extent. The police of different states apply different variations of a proactive approach to the problem of hooliganism, depending on, among other things, political priorities, training of police and other characteristics.

Proactive police tactics in confronting violence at football matches

Several studies have shown that proactive policing approach gives better results than formerly, reactive police actions³. It was the first time that such a profile of police operation was applied, on a large scale, at the 2000 European Football Championships held in Belgium and the Netherlands⁴, based on practical experience and research. At the core of the profile was the idea that the police should act towards the supporters in a friendly way, but also make clear that any form of hooliganism would not be tolerated. This approach involved the use of small police units that monitored fan groups and who performed their activities in regular uniforms, while maintaining active contact with the fans. Special unit for intervention, with their equipment to break up riots, special vehicles, service dogs, water cannons, etc., were kept out of sight of fan groups as far as possible. The police approach was based on recognizing potentially violent situations and timely intervention, until the violence escalates.

During the aforementioned Championship two models of event security were used. The first model (applied in three cities) could be called "high profile" of the order maintenance characteristic of which was maintenance of public order with a large and visible police presence on the ground. The second model, a "low profile" (in five cities), has involved the maintenance of public order with small, poorly visible police force. "Low profile" provided 10 visible police officers per 100 fans, in places where they gathered in large numbers. "High profile" included the presence of three times more policemen per 100 fans. The difference between the models was, besides in numerical presence of police officers, the fact that police officers in the "low profile" made contact

² The fact that violence is mostly connected with football fields was shown by the act "European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sporting Events, Particularly at Football matches" (the Official Gazette of the SFRY, International Agreements, no. 9/90, of March 1, 1990). The convention is related to prevention of violence at all sporting events, but it especially recognized the violence problem at football matches, where it is the most expressed, which can be seen in the title itself.

³ More expanded: Adang O., Brown E., *Policing Football in Europe*, Politieacademie Apeldoorn, 2008.

⁴ 2000 European Football Championship was held from June 10 to July 2 in Belgium and The Netherlands, which was the first time in the history that the European championship was organized by two countries.

with the fans in an easier way, showed more respect for different cultures and nationalities, played an important role in the prevention of violence and were more flexible and easier to adapt to different approaches to action fans. However, it should be emphasized that “low profile” was not a “soft” police response to violence and hooliganism. They responded to offences immediately by following the principles of zero tolerance for violence. The distribution of the police in “low profile” was based on intelligence received from the intelligence teams in the field and information received from the police of other countries. In the “high profile” there were three times more, mostly visible, police officers equipped with riot gear, with the presence of special vehicles, grouped into larger police forces, which made it difficult to establish contact with the fans.

Contrary to police estimations, during the Championships a small number of minor incidents took place. It could be concluded that the deployment of police forces contributed to the safety of events, that is, that the chosen police tactics had the expected effect. However, the correlation between a large number of officers present and the reduced number of incidents has not been determined. Analyses have shown that the increased presence of police does not necessarily lead to the reduction in incidents. The results have also shown that it is possible to maintain public order, using the model of “low profile”, without creating a state of siege or without excessive interference with the activities of fans, but this could be achieved only with police officers who performed their activities in small groups and exercised an active contact with the fans. By this method it was easier to obtain information, and the possibility that the leaders of hooligans would remain anonymous or undetected was reduced. On the other hand, the supporters were clearly made aware of what may or may not be done, so the potential of escalating violence was minimized.

During the European Football Championship which was held in Portugal in 2004 a strategic approach which was based on “low profile” to ensure public order was applied. At the request of the Portuguese national police an independent study⁵ on the behaviour of fans and the procedure of police units during the European Championships in 2004 was conducted. The study showed that an average of four officers supervised 100 fans, both in regular games and in matches with higher risk. This figure is slightly lower compared to the European Championship in 2000 when an average of six police officers had overseen 100 fans. At the European Championship in 2000 there was a difference between “low” and “high” profile, while in Portugal there was no such difference. Also, it was the fact that in Portugal there was the increased activity of plain clothes officers who covered the place where the fans gathered in large numbers. In places where the police were present, they were not in full interventional equipment, i.e. riot gear. During the championship in 2000 there was significantly greater presence of police forces for riot – whenever the “high profile” security order was used, as well as in situations where the analysis were conducted afterwards, the security assessment indicated the increased risk level. In Portugal, there was no difference between “high” and “low profile” for maintaining order in terms of visibility of emergency units because they were near the location where the fans gathered, but were positioned in such a way that they were not directly or easily visible by fans. The fact was also ascertained that during the Championship in Portugal there were almost no major incidents.

The Championship in 2000 was classified as successfully organized one as a low frequency of violence was registered, while in Portugal the absence of incidents was

5 Adang O., Brown E., *Policing Football in Europe*, Politieacademie Apeldoorn, 2008, page 214.

noted. The question is how the Portuguese police failed to stop rampaging hooligans, when other police forces previously failed to do so? One of the explanations may be sought in cooperation with other European police forces, above all, those of England and Germany, which prevented the arrival of registered hooligans. However, the arrival of a number of hooligans was prevented, but not all, but no incidents were reported anyway. A rapid and targeted police intervention in small skirmishes between fans, or situations that resemble the potential conflicts, was one of the key reasons for absence of major conflict. In this way the fans were clearly set rules of conduct that cannot be overstepped. Police strategies and tactics that were used based on the "low profile" public order maintaining, proved to be successful and contributed to the safe functioning of the championship in Portugal, with the contribution of other factors as well.

The experience gained in the Championships in 2000 and 2004 was later used at the World Cup in 2006 in Germany and in 2008 at the European Championship in Switzerland. Also, the experiences are adopted in the acts of the European Union as well, primarily through the improved version of the *Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, which includes at least one European Union member states*.⁶

In 2006 a group of researchers from Sweden⁷, while maintaining the Football World Cup in Germany, investigated a proactive police approach to the hooligans during the organization of high-risk matches. The research focused on two cities, Frankfurt and Dortmund. The strategy of the police in Frankfurt, as well as in other cities where matches were played, was based on the classical concept of separation of fans, i.e. on preventing contact between the fan groups in order to prevent hooligan outbursts. In contrast to this approach, the strategy in Dortmund was different. The police tried to enable the meeting of fans before the match, but under controlled conditions, or under the supervision of the police. This strategy was later assessed as a successful example of a proactive approach in combating violence and hooliganism.⁸ The approach based on the development of communication between the police and supporters and it basically derived from a program that was developed by police in Dortmund in 1980s, to counter hooligans of the football club Borussia fans from Dortmund. The police, in cooperation with the local government which funded the program, secured the large open spaces, squares and parks where the fans could gather and where the fans of different football teams met. In these areas the fans were able to consume food and drink, and have fun before and after the game. Very often the concerts were held there. Thus, contacts between the various fan groups existed, but under controlled conditions set by the police. A large number of policemen in plain clothes mingled among the fans with a mission to gather information, but also to conduct and control the activities of certain hooligans or violent groups. On the other hand, at these locations there was a very small number of uniformed police officers and their task was to let the fans know that the police was present and wanted to make contact with them. The police acted in accordance with the "low profile" model which included a flexible response to

6 The first version of the handbook was issued by the EU Council at June 21, 1999, with the title "The handbook for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violent behaviour in connection with international football matches". The next handbook from 2001 had the title: "The handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances at football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved". Amended versions of the handbook with the same title were issued at December 4, 2006, and June 3, 2010.

7 Jern S., Näslund J., *Inter-group play and symbols of a mass event at the World Cup in football 2006*, The 6th Nordic Conference on Group and Social Psychology- Dynamics Within and Outside the Lab, Lund, 2009, page 117.

8 Hau S., *Communication as the most important Police Strategy at the Football World Cup Final 2006*, Institutionen för beteendevetenskap Linköpings universitet Forum för organisationsoch gruppforskning, 2008, page 1.

the treatment of fans and action depending on the behavior of fans. This flexibility stopped at the moments when the fans displayed violent behavior and then the police responded vigorously to the hooligans. The police in Dortmund did not show a large number of visible police force, and those that were visible achieved very close contact with the fans and informed them why certain measures and activities were taken, so that fans would not have a wrong impression and be upset because of them. Operational police officers in plain clothes were inside the fan groups; they gathered information about the activities of hooligans and informed other police units when something happened. Then specially equipped units undertook actions and adapted their tactics depending on the situation; i.e. they neither immediately used the force, nor immediately detained persons. And then, in critical situations, it was very important to communicate with fans. However, if a specific act of violence occurred, the police would react immediately, very vigorously and effectively. Such a tactic was used at the World Championship in 2006. The basic idea was to make the place for meeting of fans under the control of the police, which would facilitate the work of police officers, i.e. they would have to run from one to the other side of town to "put out the fire". A part of the idea was that the police officers conducted individual interviews with potential hooligans in order to let them know that they were under the police surveillance. The idea predicted that teams of police officers working in the field were in a fixed composition. This meant that the teams would be composed of the same officers throughout the World Cup. Each team was carrying out different set of tasks, but the team composition was the same throughout the season. In such a way team members built a routine and gained confidence in what they were doing. As a result, they perform their tasks more effectively, calmly and professionally. The teams comprised of police officers who had had a lot of experience in working at football matches, as well as knowledge to assess the behavior of fans. The presence of different kinds of police units guaranteed a flexible response of the police, depending on the reaction of fans. Plain clothes police officers followed the movement of fans and signaled the possible violent activities. At the same time, uniformed police forces were placed in different parts of the city.

From the previous remarks of the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal and Germany police actions and different variations of their proactive action, the basic principles of proactivity in combating football hooliganism can be generalized:

- BALANCE – In a proactive approach to combat football hooliganism it has been shown that it is extremely important to maintain a balance between the need for visible forces, uniformed police officers, who will affect the audience in a preventive way and the fact that excessive presence of uniformed persons may adversely affect the fans. Despite the excessive presence of security forces, taking a large number of police measures may encourage aggression by the fans.
- ASSESSMENT – for a successful maintenance of public order, it is critical that the police are compliant with the relevant risk assessment, because in this way the possibility of incidents is reduced. It is of great practical importance to make an accurate assessment of the social identity of fan groups - the values and standards, goals, a sense of what is right for them, stereotypes and expectations of other fan groups, earlier incidents (time, place, objects, ways of manifesting it), etc.
- COMMUNICATION – In order to avoid conflict situations, it is important to establish communication with the fans in a proactive manner. Whenever possible, communication with supporters should be carried out by police officers who are familiar with fan groups or have even gained the trust of fans. In any

case, it is important that the communication is done in a language the fans understand and in an unambiguous way.

- ACCESSIBILITY TO THE FANS – in every phase of work, wherever and whenever possible, police conduct should be such as to facilitate the fulfillment of the aims and objectives of fans, if they are reasonable and legitimate. When the police need to enforce certain restrictions on the behavior of fans, it is important that they explain the reasons behind the implementation of limitations and that they provide another alternative means by which they can meet their legitimate goals.
- DIFFERENTIATION – In planning and making decisions about the police action, the specificities of different groups of football fans must be taken into account, according to different parameters (nationality, number, goals, cultural specificity, etc.). If these differences are not taken into consideration and if police activity planning approach is routine and stereotypic, the risk of an outbreak of incidents is greatly increased.

Common feature of all the aforementioned variants of the police action was that they were primarily pro-active, and only secondarily have had a repressive character. During the emergence of violence, the police applied targeted and rapid interventions to make it clear which rules of behavior are acceptable and which are not, and how to prevent escalation of violence. In all variants of action, small units for monitoring, in regular uniforms, were able to easily realize an active approach and make contact with fans. Also, there were decentralized units for intervention (with special equipment, riot vehicles, service dogs, and water cannons) located as far as possible away from the place of meeting fans or playing the match. In the preceding examples the planning activity of the police was based on the rapid flow of information received from the teams on the field or from other international police organizations, using the knowledge and experience with foreign police who cooperated. The basis for all variations of police activity is the use of the concept of “community policing” in addition to the traditional “criminal intelligence/investigative approach.” The approach of community policing focus is on management of events at public meetings through direct and open interaction with fans.

Collecting data on hooligans

A prerequisite for proactive police actions is availability of full, accurate, timely information about fans and hooligans, their movements and activities. A very important information is the number of fans who will attend the game, whether they are organized, whether they acted violently in the past, if they intend to conflict with other fan groups and others, because on the basis of these data the security assessment planning and engagement of police forces are made. There are numerous methods of obtaining intelligence about hooligans. One possible method is the use of covert operations and infiltration of police officers in a hooligan group. Information obtained by this method can be described as the best, most reliable and in every way mostly used in police work. However, this method has drawbacks because of which in each specific situation it should be assessed whether to apply it. First, we should make selection of candidates from among officers who are mentally and physically prepared to voluntarily participate in this method. Wrong selection of candidates could adversely affect the execution of the task. Second, any error, infiltration of police officer or another from the police organization could endanger

the life of infiltrators. Third, for this method there is the need of special funds since the infiltrated police officer must completely change the way of life (car, clothing, and home address) in some cases. Fourth, in order to reach important information the infiltrated police officer must gain the confidence of the leader of a fan group, which is not at all an easy task that can take a long time (several months to several years) for which police often do not have time considering a number of tasks that are placed in front of them⁹ nowadays.

Today, one of the major methods by which the police obtain information about hooligans is the use of police officers as “spotters”, as referred to in the jargon. The system of “spotters” is designed so that every police officer who carries out this activity is associated with a certain football team. His task is to identify and monitor hooligans of a particular club, especially when traveling to the away games. These officers come into close relations with their local clubs, with the leaders of fan groups, and with registered hooligans. Such a system¹⁰ is the most diverse in the UK where the National Football Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has been founded. All data that “the spotters” have collected in the field are submitted to the said unit. NFIU coordinates the collection and dissemination of intelligence information and forwards them, as appropriate, to other police units in England and Wales. This unit has a high level of cooperation with other similar units and provides them with necessary information. Similar units exist in Germany and the Netherlands. In preparation for a sporting event the unit collects information on traveling fans from several sources, including civilian airlines and other transportation companies. In addition to “the spotters”, the unit uses mobile liaison officers as well, whose job is monitoring the fans at away games at home and abroad, who are responsible for:

- dissemination of information on sports fans who are expected to commit an act of violence;
- the disclosure or, if possible, identification of the already known hooligans, including the location of their meeting and accommodation during travel;
- the prevention of possible violations of public order in places where the fans gather.

Modern technologies are also an important part of the police fight against hooliganism. All major stadiums in Europe are covered by video surveillance, by which hooligans, counselors and every illegal act of fans can be identified. Some stadiums, such as, for example, Old Trafford, Manchester (United Kingdom), have a special police control room to monitor developments, both at the stadium and around it. To supplement the video surveillance at stadiums police officers in plain clothes use video cameras to capture anyone who exhibits suspicious behavior in the crowd outside the stadium. A similar role is played by front-line intelligence teams and teams to gather intelligence. The difference between these teams is that the first teams have a proactive role, and other a repressive role. Front-line intelligence teams are used to gather information on movement of fans or registered hooligans who are willing to engage in violence. These teams are deployed along with the teams for collecting evidence. Front-line intelligence teams consist of two or three uniformed police officers. They are trained in intelligence gathering on the change of mood among fans and hooligan groups, their movements, intentions, which are delivered to command headquarters after being collected. Based on the information obtained, the headquarters plan and deploy police forces depending on the situation on the

⁹ Јанковић Б., *Превенција насиља на спортским приредбама*, Гласник права, бр.3/10, page 142.

¹⁰ <http://people.exeter.ac.uk/watupman/undergrad/rowlands/policingncis.htm>, March 01, 2010.

ground. All the information recorded in the field (of incidents, identified hooligans and other information) are entered the intelligence reports after returning from the field. Their action is purely proactive, because their task ends when there is a disturbance of public order, when the units trained for fighting and suppressing the violent mass come into action.

The tasks of intelligence teams are as follows:

- to identify individuals and groups that may participate or may cause acts of violence;
- to establish a dialogue with individuals or groups in order to obtain intelligence information;
- to provide up to date information about events on the ground to managers of police units and headquarters in order to distribute power appropriate to the situation on the ground in an effective and successful way;
- to gather intelligence information by observing and communicating with fans, supported by videos, photographs or obtained by other technical means;
- to maintain contact with other police officers who secure sports event for possible identifications of hooligans who have been involved in violence;
- to seek and identify hooligans who have taken refuge at bus and railway stations, shopping malls and other public places;
- to monitor and identify areas where the hooligans gather before and after the breaking of completed matches;
- to identify solitary groups of hooligans after clashes with police and possibly follow them;
- to gather information on future activities of hooligans.

Databases are also very important in combating hooliganism. All persons involved or suspected of being involved in hooliganism should be recorded there. Information from databases can be shared with other international police organizations to exchange information about perpetrators or persons who are suspected to have links with violence at football matches.

International police cooperation aiming to share intelligence on hooligans

By the Decision of the Council of the EU in 2002, it was proposed to each member to establish a national office to exchange information on football competitions security (NFIP) that would be responsible for cooperation in the organization of events involving more than one EU country. Its role is to coordinate exchange of information on football matches at the national level, and when necessary to provide training and work of intelligence officers or "spotters". NFIP would have a role and be a channel for the exchange of information with countries not belonging to the EU. In the case that these countries do not have a specialized state body for the exchange of such information, it is necessary to designate the authority which will cooperate with the NFIP of the European Union countries. The European Championship held in 2004 became the first contest that felt the benefits of establishing offices. Indeed, compared with previous major events held on the European continent, in Portugal there were no major incidents. The decision from 2002 was amended in 2007 when it was agreed that each member of his office is to provide access to (different) databases of "risk" persons who are mostly found in the possession of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and to ensure that Member States exchange offices begin analyzing critical situations that have occurred in previously held competitions and, finally, that

every office must make a list of recommendations (generalized from the previous experiences) which will then be made available to partners via internet presentation or through the office requires. The amendment of the decision provided the deadline for assessing the effectiveness of members in respect of the decision letter¹¹.

Intelligence data have been submitted to other police organizations according to the established procedure, in accordance with the recommendation of the Council of Europe T-RV/97/1¹². By this recommendation the classification of fans was made in the following order:

- Category "A" - peaceful, true fans;
- Category "B" - the fans at risk to harm the public order, particularly in cases when under the influence of alcohol, and
- Category "C" - violent supporters or leaders of the fans.

The intelligence concerning fans had been delivered in accordance with this division by 2006, when the existing "Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances at football matches with an international dimension, which includes at least one European Union Member States" was updated with new research and has formulated a new classification of fans. Old category "A" fans is the new categorized as fans that were "not risky" and category "B" and "C" are classified as "risky" fans.¹³

Risky fans are known or unknown persons who may pose a potential risk for disturbing public order or antisocial behavior at football matches or in connection with them, whether they are planned or are spontaneously formed. Fans who are not risky are known or unknown persons who pose no risk for the occurrence of violence or disorder at football matches or related to them, regardless of whether they are planned or are spontaneously generated.

There are two types of information exchanged between police of different states – general and personal information. General information can be divided into three categories:

- strategic information – information that defines the event in all its dimensions, with special attention to safety and security risks;
- operational information – helping police officers at the operational level in making a risk analysis, and
- tactical information – helping police officers at the operational level to adequately respond to all security problems that arise during the event.

Personal data refer to information about individuals who are supposed to be a potential risk to the safety of events maintenance. They can contain information about individuals who have previously caused violence or disorder, or participated in them, and are connected with football matches. Information can be exchanged before, during and after the event. These three phases need not always be strictly separated.

The NFIP task of the organizing country, before the events occur, is to send a request for information to other states at the strategic level, which will include fans' risk analysis and other relevant information concerning the safety of the event and

11 Савковић М., Ђорђевић С., *На путу превенциј насиља на спортским приредбама: предлог регионалног облика сарадње*, Београдски центар за безбедносну политику, Београд, 2010, page 20.

12 http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/sport/Resources/texts/sprec97.1.memotrv_en.asp#TopOfPage, March 01, 2010.

13 *Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved*, Official Journal of the European Union (2006/C 322/01), page. 18.

a description of threats that endanger a sports event. At the operational level, the NFIP country which supplies this information should deliver accurate and timely information on movements of risky and non-risky fans, on tickets sale and other relevant information. A country that possesses relevant information about the fans must submit them to other countries even if there is no request for data collection. During the occurrence of the football event, the NFIP of the organizers may request confirmation of information previously provided, and the request to update the risk analysis. The organizer country must provide information on the return of fans that were banned to enter the country or were expelled, to the countries of origin or transit. After the event the organizer country must provide information about the behavior of the fans to other countries so that countries of origin could update the risk analysis of individual fans, as well as details of any incidents which were participated in or were caused by visiting fans.

CONCLUSION

Hooliganism at football matches could be reduced in a socially acceptable framework by quality and security assessment of risk level of the emergence of incidents, by monitoring and suppressing the extreme fans' intentions, their isolation and effective intervention, with the participation and coordinated cooperation of public authorities, sports organizations and clubs, care and educational institutions and the media. In confronting violence at football matches the repressive measures should not be totally ignored, on the contrary, but a proactive approach should be preferred. This approach allows the mutual interference of different, rival fan groups, it may not result in conflicts and the emergence of violence, i.e. the fans can work together to support their favorites and to establish good or at least friendly relations among them.

A large number of police officers, who are equipped with emergency equipment for riots and placed in a prominent place, do not guarantee that there will not be violence and disturbance of public order. On the contrary, a small group of police officers in regular uniforms, which are in contact with the fans, can ensure safe operation of the game. A continuous flow of accurate and timely information enables police forces to maintain control over the behavior of fans. Police officers, who ensure public order in a certain area, should not look menacing, but on the contrary, they should try to treat the fans, wherever possible, in a friendly way and to establish communication with them so that the atmosphere is relaxed. Information on the movements of known hooligans should be delivered to all police units and every police officer should be familiar with them, in order to implement well-organized, focused and limited intervention to these parties, without prejudice to other fans. It is important that during such interventions a mistake is not made of arresting or using the force to peaceful fans, which could lead to dissatisfaction with other fans and initiate an escalation of unrest.

Since joining the EU is a priority foreign policy objective to the Republic of Serbia, there must be rules and procedures agreed relating to the fight against hooliganism, in line with the EU standards in the future. The first step in these activities is the foundation of a specialized office to exchange information on security of football competitions (NFIP), but also the adoption of all other regulations of the EU. The fact that Serbia lacks such specialized office was found in Genoa in 2010 during a football match Italy-Serbia, when due to inadequate exchange of intelligence about hooligans the riots in the stadium occurred. The police of the Republic of Serbia have units that are capable of opposing the repressive hooliganism, but more work on a proactive approach must be done, which is not as adequately represented as in the EU countries.

REFERENCES

1. Adang O., Brown E., *Policing Football in Europe*, Politie academie Apeldoorn, 2008.
2. *Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved*, Official Journal of the European Union (2006/C 322/01).
3. *Council Resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved*, Official Journal of the European Union (2010/C 165/01).
4. *European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at sporting events, particularly at football matches*, Official Gazette of the SFRY, International Agreements, no. 9 / 90, of 01.03.1990.)
5. *Explanatory memorandum on Recommendation (T-RV/97/1)* http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/sport/Resources/texts/sprec97.1.memotrv_en.asp#TopOfPage, March 03, 2010.
6. Јанковић Б., *Превенција насиља на спортским приредбама*, Гласник Права, бр. 3/10.
7. Jern S., Näslund J., *Inter-group play and symbols of a mass event at the World Cup in football 2006*, The 6h Nordic Conference on Group and Social Psychology-Dynamics Within and Outside the Lab, Lund, 2009. page 111-130.
8. Милојевић С., *Основи полицијске тактике*, Криминалистичко-полицијска академија, Београд, 2008.
9. *Policing European football hooliganis*, <http://people.exeter.ac.uk/watupman/undergrad/rowlands/policingncis.htm>, March 01, 2010.
10. Савковић М., Ђорђевић С., *На путу превенције насиља на спортским приредбама: предлог регионалног оквира сарадње*, Београдски центар за безбедносну политику, Београд, 2010.
11. Spaaij R., *The prevention of football hooliganism: a transnational perspective*, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research University of Amsterdam, <http://cafyd.com/HistDeporte/htm/pdf/4-16.pdf>, January 09, 2011.
12. Hau S., *Communication as the most important Police Strategy at the Football World Cup Final 2006*, Institutionen för beteendevetenskap Linköpings universitet Forum för organisationsoch gruppforskning, 2008.