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THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL RISK ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY APPLICATION OF THE MATRICES OF PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES

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Abstract: By comparing the risk theory and the relevant standard with the Law on Prevention of Domestic Violence (Law), it comes to the conclusion that risk management, especially in the domain of its assessment, is based on qualitative methods of analysis. Thus, the potential for the application of semi-quantitative and quantitative risk analysis methods in the application of the said regulation is not used. As it is too ambitious to problematize the purpose and the possibility of implementation of both types of methods of risk analysis in the Law by one paper, this paper deals with possibility and limitations of the conversion of qualitative into quantitative data in the function of risk assessment in the doctrine and practice of preventing domestic violence in the Republic of Serbia. More precisely, the work has identified the purpose, possibilities, limitations and the proposal of their overcoming, in the implication of the matrices of probability and consequences, as a semi-quantitative method of analysing the specific risk in the doctrine and practice of preventing domestic violence in the mentioned spatial framework. This contributes to the creation of conditions that support the effective implementation of the Law, which are not foreseen as a potential for improving the doctrine and practice of preventing domestic violence by using matrices of probability and consequences, while recognizing the identified limitations. The verification of this research creates a starting point for the development of standards for the quantification of the risk of domestic violence, which creates the conditions for

¹ This paper is the result of the research on the following projects: “Development of Institutional Capacities, Standards and Procedures for Fighting Organized Crime and Terrorism in Climate of International Integrations”, which is financed by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia (No 179045), and carried out by the Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies in Belgrade (2011-2018). The leader of the Project is Full Professor Saša Mijalković, PhD and “Management of police organization in preventing and mitigating threats to security in the Republic of Serbia“, which is financed and carried out by the Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade - The cycle of scientific projects 2015-2019”, which is financed by the Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies. e-mail: subosicdane@yahoo.com

the mentioned assessments to be more accurate in terms of precision, ranking and risk classification, as well as the reduction of discretionary decision-making. This would create the conditions for defining good practice in this area, which could be taken to the necessary extent in other countries.

Keywords: *assessment, risk, domestic violence, matrices of probability and consequences, limitations, Standard.*

INTRODUCTION

Key elements of risk management theory and relevant risk management standard, to a significant extent but not completely, explicitly or implicitly are implemented in the *Law on prevention of domestic violence* ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 94/2016; Subošić, Stevanović, 2018). This primarily refers to the application of qualitative - not semi-quantitative and quantitative (Savic, Stankovic, 2012: 276) risk analysis of the reported hazards of domestic violence. However, qualitative risk analysis is very generalized and simplified, so it only implies the determination of existence (the risk is greater than zero) or non-existence (the risk is zero) of immediate danger of domestic violence, that is, the presence or absence of legally determined risk factors for that violence in a reported case, which is appropriate for the work of police officers. In addition, the Law does not stipulate the risk of domestic violence by intensity, depending on the type of violence (the danger is the same for all types of violence, in addition to the risk being greater than zero). Finally, the Law does not indicate the presence of semi-quantitative and quantitative methods of risk analysis, which would result in estimates based on numerical values, both individually (appropriate for the work of police officers) and general risk of domestic violence - appropriate for the work of managers (Subošić, Stevanović, 2018).

The absence of the quantification of the risk of domestic violence in the Law makes it impossible to: 1) classify risks to acceptable and unacceptable, and 2) prioritize risk treatment. The absence of quantification of the risk of domestic violence makes it impossible to determine the threshold of the risk of that violence, as the limit values classify them into acceptable and unacceptable, and therefore the risks that require or do not require appropriate treatment. On the other hand, the absence of the quantification of the risk of domestic violence makes it impossible to prioritize the treatment of (non-)acceptable risks. Depending on the hypothetical manner that the unregulated areas are regulated analogously to the areas that are regulated, it can be considered that the *Security and resilience of society-risk assessment, which is covered by the same standard* (Standard), is an analogous area of assessment of the risk of domestic violence (*Standard SRPS A.L2.003:2017: Security and Resilience of Society-Risk Assessment*). This standard envisages risk assessment using a semi-quantitative method for analyzing probability matrices and consequences. This paper presents an attempt to assess the risk of reported case of domestic violence using the Standard, and therefore the *probability and consequence matrix method*, taking into account the identified constraints, with the intent of mitigating or overcoming the weaknesses in the application of qualitative risk assessment methods provided by the Law. In this regard, the work can be useful for improving the work of competent authorities in the area of preventing domestic violence (police, public prosecutors, courts and misdemeanor courts) and other institutions (social work centers and other). This particularly refers to the assessment (identification, analysis and evaluation) of the specific and general risk of domestic violence for the purpose of their treatment. The Assessment, therefore, and the treatment of risks should be continuous, because the risk is a dynamic phenomenon (Douglas, Skeem, 2005: 347–383).

IDENTIFICATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RISK BY APPLYING THE MATRIX OF PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES

Identifying the risk of domestic violence is the process of identifying the dangers of all types that can endanger the safety and integrity of family members, which also includes recognizing the conditions (*hazards*) that are suitable for the dangers (specific types of violence), resulting in the occurrence of a risky event (acts of domestic violence). This means that, in principle, certain dangers (for example, from physical injuries) favour certain conditions (eg, non-working day), during which the victim is more exposed to violence in relation to a working day, since it is to be expected that the victim and the abuser spend more time together in the same place on a non-working day, as is not the case on a working day (if they live in the same household).

The existence of an imminent threat of domestic violence in each reported case is determined by the identification of some of the special risk factors that are prescribed by the Law as follows: "Earlier violence in the family and the willingness of a possible perpetrator to repeat this violence; etc." (*Law on prevention of domestic violence*: 16). Some of the risk factors are prescribed in the *Special protocol on the treatment of police officers in cases of violence against woman in family and in partnership relationships* (<https://www.sigurnakuca.net/upload/documents/PlaviTekst.pdf>: 11-12, accessed 20. 01. 2018). This means that the factual situation which is related to the specific case of domestic violence is compared by the police officer with the stated risk factors in the function of his assessment (*Law on prevention of domestic violence*: 15), which is qualitative (based on words), both generalized and simplified, because it does not contain quantification, which is disabled: 1) comparing the size of the risk with its threshold (limit value) and 2) risk prioritization. In order to avoid these weaknesses in the qualitative analysis, it would be desirable if the competent police officer is able to compare the factual situation (data from the criminal charge and other), relating to the specific case of domestic violence, with the equivalent of domestic violence and requirements and evaluation criteria for assessing the risk of unlawful activity in the Standard (*Standard SRPS A.L2.003:2017: Security and Resilience of Society-Risk Assessment*), which refers to "violent crime and serious violations against public order and peace" (*Standard*: 34, 40). For example, the reporting of domestic violence (within the meaning of the Law), which can also be qualified as a criminal offense "Non-maintenance", from the Article 195 of the *Criminal Code*, may contain the following:²¹⁶ "By the final and enforceable judgment of the first basic court in Belgrade, the marriage between Petar Petrović and the applicant Marija Petrović was divorced, and the joint children, the minor Marko and Jovan Petrović, were assigned to mother Marija Petrović for custody. With the same verdict, Petar Petrović is obliged, in the name of contribution for the maintenance of children, to pay to the current account of Marija Petrović, an amount of 10.000,00 dinars for each child, every month. As Petar does not pay the money for the contribution of child support for 10 months, Marija reported his behaviour to the local police station as a domestic violence (<https://www.besplatnapravnapomoc.rs/primer-krivicne-prijave>. accessed 17. 02. 2017.)."²¹⁷

The identification of risk of domestic violence in this case using the relevant Standard would involve comparing the data from the application and other relevant data for the reported case of violence, with a *criteria for identifying the risk of unlawful action* (*Standard*:

² In addition to using the procedure for assessing the risk of domestic violence, the same data would, in the specific case, be used to file a criminal complaint with the competent public prosecutor's office, due to the commission of the alleged criminal offense.

³ This example, although common, is not a typical example of domestic violence. In this regard, there are many more typical cases of domestic violence that result in deaths, injuries and other injuries which are accompanied by psychological and other types of violence.

Attachment DJ, Table DJ.1) that corresponds to police prevention of domestic violence. The criteria include:

1. Existence of a system of physical and technical protection of persons,⁴¹⁹ including the existence of appropriate licenses,⁵²⁰ and fulfilling other legal requirements.
2. Undertaking regular and prescribed protection measures to clients,⁶²¹ in relation to threats from the execution of violent delicts, and
3. Employees are trained to timely identify threats from the commission of criminal offenses and properly react⁷²² to mitigate or prevent the consequences,⁸²³ with the existence of systemic and continuous employee training,⁹²⁴ existence of response plans by groups of delicts,¹⁰²⁵ and the making of regular analysis of the state of security and the risk of unlawful action (*Standard: Attachment DJ (normative), Criteria for identifying the risk of unlawful activity, Table DJ.1 – Criteria for identifying the risk of unlawful activity*).

Comparing this factual situation with the requirements and criteria for assessing the risk of unlawful activity in the Standard, the size of the danger is “MINIMAL=1” (*Standard: Attachment DJ (normative), Criteria for identifying the risk of unlawful activity, Table DJ.1 – Criteria for identifying the risk of unlawful activity*). In this regard, it is necessary to record the identified risks and the size of the hazard. It is done with a *form for the record of identified risks and the extent of danger* (*Standard: Attachment LJ (Normative), Form for recording the identified risks and the extent of danger, Table LJ.1 – Form for recording the identified risks and the extent of danger*). By it, the possibility of violent crime and serious violations against public order and peace (about domestic violence in the context of public order and peace see more in: Marković, 2015: 211-231) is described by facts (e.g. criminal charges and other data) and quantifies descriptively and numerically, as already stated.

Based on the previous analysis, primarily due to inadequate terminology, it is concluded that the existing Standard cannot be applied consistently in identifying the risk of domestic violence, which is why there is a need to develop a specific standard for identifying the risk of domestic violence in a specific case, which in some countries is the case. An example for that is a widespread standard *Domestic Violence Risk Identification Matrix* (DVRIM), known also as *Barnardo’s*, which is intended to protect children as victims of male-female domestic violence and contains four levels of risk, from 1 (moderate), through 2 (moderate to serious) and 3 (serious), to 4 (hard). To the indicated intensity of domestic violence, this standard comes to the so-called “Check list”, through which quality is transferred to quantity, which makes it a semi-quantitative method of risk assessment (https://www.reducingtherisk.org.uk/cms/sites/reducingtherisk/files/folders/resources/risk_and_safety/Child_risk_indicator_matrix_and_next_steps_june_2010_A3.pdf, accessed 11.3.2018). What you gain by this is, in family violence, a conversion of quality into quantity, because the descriptive risk factors (the factual situation as per Article 16 of the Law) receive the size of the danger, which in the demonstrated case is (“MINIMAL=1”). Therefore, in order to mitigate the listed weaknesses in qualitative risk identification in the specific case of domestic violence, the conditions are created for making the assessment more valid, which creates the conditions for risk analysis using the semi-quantitative method of *matrices of probability and consequences*.

4 Police objectively represents a system of physically-technically protected values.

5 After successful specialized trainings.

6 Citizens, as users of services provided by the police and other entities to prevent domestic violence.

7 Police officers, especially competent in the sense of the law.

8 Emergency measures within the meaning of the law.

9 Specialized and other training in the meaning of the law.

10 Violence in the family as a criminal offense, offense and risk (danger).

ANALYSIS OF THE RISK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE USING THE MATRIX OF PROBABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES

The matrices of probability and consequences are the method prescribed by the risk assessment standard. This standard is intended for numerous users, including public authorities, and including the police (*Standard: 6*). In terms of the Standard, the risk matrix (probability and consequence) is a tool for ranking and showing risk, defining the scope for (1) probability and (2) consequences of events. In addition to that, *probability* (P) is a combination of *exposure* (E) and *vulnerability* (V) of the protected value in relation to the identified risk and is determined according to the following:

$$P = E \# V$$

Exposure (E) represents a degree to which a victim of domestic violence is susceptible to the influence of the event. If there are event logs, in addition to exposure, the organization will take into consideration the frequency of it as well. In this regard, the *frequency* (F) refers to the repetition of events over a certain period of time and is an integral part of the exposure. Frequency estimation is carried out on the basis of data on the existence of valid data records.

The determination of exposure (E) and frequency (F) of domestic violence is possible by using data related to the cooperation of competent authorities and institutions in preventing domestic violence in criminal proceedings for numerous crimes (*Law on the prevention of domestic violence: 4*). Therefore, the application of the matrix of probability and consequences method is demonstrated by the application of data relating to the “Non-serving” offense referred to in Article 195 of the *Criminal Code*, for which the victim was, for example, exposed for ten months to ten harmful events, before deciding to file a criminal complaint. The data from the previous case should be compared with the *Exposure Criteria* (E) (*Standard: Attachment N* (normative), given in the following table, in order to determine the degree and extent of the victim’s exposure to the mentioned criminal offense. In this regard, the following table is stated.

Table 1: Table N.2 – Exposure Criteria

Exposure (E)		Description of exposure and/or frequency (at least for the last three calendar years)
Degree of exposure	Size of exposure	
1	Negligible	Daily, exposure of threats of one to two days and/or one or no harmful events
2	Occasional	Weekly, exposure to threats of three to seven days and/or two to five harmful events
3	Long	Monthly, exposure to threats of one to twelve months and/or six to ten harmful events
4	Predominantly	Annually, exposure to threats of one to three years and/or eleven to fifteen harmful events
5	Permanent	Perennially, exposure to threats for many years and/or over fifteen harmful events

By providing the data from the previous example in the context of the *Criteria for determining exposure* (E)¹¹³⁴ from Table 1, it is concluded that the victim’s exposure to the criminal

11 And/or frequency.

offense is such that the degree is “3”, and that the size is “long”. By comparing the data from the previous example with the *Exposure criteria* (E), it can be concluded that this “factual state” corresponds to and is suitable for this part of the Standard, and with it, the exposure in the function of risk quantification can be determined.

Vulnerability (V) represents the existing state of protection, that is, the sensitivity of the protected value to the identified risks. In this regard, on November 23, 2016, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted the *Law on the prevention of domestic violence*. According to this Law, the prevention of this kind of violence implies: 1) a set of measures that reveal the existence of an immediate threat of violence in the family¹²³⁵ and 2) a set of measures which are applied when that immediate danger is discovered (*Law on the prevention of domestic violence*: 17). Although the suspect and the victim are divorced and do not live in the same household, having in mind that filing a criminal complaint may cause the suspect to cause a revolt against her applicant, there is a basis that with the risk assessment, it can be established that there is *an imminent threat from that violence*. In addition to the police, other state bodies (police, public prosecution, court, centre for social work, and other institutions) have jurisdiction in the prevention of domestic violence.

The stated facts (there is an imminent threat of violence, the protection has the characteristics of completeness: the focus on the suspect and the victim, the preventive/repercussion treatment, the multi-sector cooperation) should be compared with the criteria for determining the vulnerability from the following table in order to determine the degree and extent of vulnerability when it comes to the specific case of domestic violence. More precisely, multi-sector cooperation in the context of the *Community Policing* Concept is a valid framework for combating domestic violence, but the police culture creates a negotiating rather than a cooperative working (organizational) environment (Giacomazzi, Smithy, 2001: 99–122). Complex conflicts require co-operation in problem-oriented work (Straus, 1993: 29).

Table 2: Table N.3 - *Vulnerability assessment criteria (Standard: Attachment N, Table N.3.)*

Vulnerability		Description of vulnerability
Degree of vulnerability	Size of vulnerability	
1	Very big	Protection measures are not applied or do not exist
2	Big	Isolated protection measures are applied (only physical protection, only technical protection)
3	Medium	Physical and technical protection is applied, but not normative-organizational procedural measures of protection
4	Small	Multiple protection measures are applied, without risk assessment
5	Very small	A complete, optimally designed protection exists, according to the risk assessment

Comparing the above paragraph with the criteria for determining the vulnerability from the previous table, a description of the vulnerability that corresponds to the level “5” and the vulnerability “very small” is presented. Determining the value of exposure/frequency of violence in the family “3” and vulnerability “5”, the conditions for determining the likelihood of domestic violence has been created. However, although this table seems undoubtful, only

¹² Possible perpetrator of domestic violence may be pronounced by a competent police officer - when in the risk assessment procedure he establishes that there are immediate dangers of that violence.

the formally prescribed measures for the protection of the victim appear in it as a criterion of vulnerability, and not the actual state of implementation of these measures. In reality, irrespective of the prescribed measures, the vulnerable situations of the victim can be very different. This leads to the conclusion that the existing Standard cannot be applied consistently in determining the vulnerability of the victim, which is why there is a need to develop a specific standard for determining the size of the risk of domestic violence in a specific case, which, as already stated in the section which is dedicated to risk identification - *Domestic Violence Risk Identification Matrix* (DVRIM), is known also as Barnardo's (https://www.reducingtherisk.org.uk/cms/sites/reducingtherisk/files/folders/resources/risk_and_safety/Child_risk_indicator_matrix_and_next_steps_june_2010_A3.pdf, 11.3.2018). Taking into account the stated limitation of the application of the Standard and the manner of its mitigation or resolution, *the Matrix for determining the probability* (the following table) is stated.

Table 3: Table N.4 - Matrix for determining probability

Vulnerability (V)		Very big	Big	Medium	Small	Very small
Exposure (E)		1	2	3	4	5
Negligible	1	3	2	1	1	1
Occasional	2	4	3	2	2	1
Long	3	5	4	3	2	2
Superior	4	5	4	3	3	3
Permanent	5	5	5	4	3	3

The carried out analysis determined the probability of the risk of domestic violence in the analysed case with the size “2” Describing the probability of the size “2”, the *Criteria for determining the probability* (P) (Standard: Attachment N, Table N.1) there comes the conclusion that it is “incredible”, in other words that it is *Probability above 1%: it did not happen, but it could happen or could happen “in some cases in ten years”*. Theoretical research confirms the frequency of reporting domestic violence of 1%. The survey estimated that 1% of women aged 18-62 at Rhode Island (USA) reported during the calendar year at least one case of domestic violence (Pearlman, et al., 2003: 51). We came to this value of risk through exposure and vulnerability, with their identified weaknesses (Standard), it can be concluded that the determined value of the probability of domestic violence, as a consequence, has the same weaknesses. The way to overcome them is to develop a specific standard for assessing the risk of domestic violence.

Consequences (C) represent the effect of a harmful event on the protected values, and are manifested through the size of the loss (damage) in relation to the critical value of the protected value. Consequences are determined according to the following expression:

$$C = D \cdot Cr$$

Damage (D) is a measure of damage of protected values. Domestic violence is a very dangerous phenomenon, bearing in mind that its average in the Republic of Serbia in the period 2011-2015 included 53.8 people per year (*Strategic assessment of public safety: public version 2017: 36*) who died, which means that the victims of domestic violence may be deprived of life. Such consequences are the equivalent of the most serious damages. On the other hand, financially, if the monthly damage from a criminal offense of 20,000.00 dinars is observed, in the circumstances in which the victim has a monthly income of 60,000.00 dinars, it comes to the conclusion that she was damaged in the amount of 1/3, or 33.33% of revenues. In this re-

gard, this information should be compared with the *Damage Criteria (D)*, which is indicated in the following table.

Table 4: *Table No.1 - Criteria for determining damages (D) (Standard: Attachment NJ, Table NJ.1.)*

Damage (D)		Description of damage
Degree of damage	Size of damage	
1	Very small	$\leq 5\%$ of realized job incomes from the last published sheet of success
2	Small	$> 5\% \leq 10\%$ of realized job incomes from the last published sheet of success
3	Medium	$> 10\% \leq 15\%$ of realized job incomes from the last published sheet of success
4	Big	$> 15\% \leq 20\%$ of realized job incomes from the last published sheet of success
5	Very big	$> 20\%$ of realized job incomes from the last published sheet of success

Comparing the reported data on the consequences of family violence with the criteria for determining the damage from the previous table, we come to the description of damage corresponding to the most serious degree “5” and the size of the vulnerability “very large”. Such (monetary) quantification of damages is possible in cases of economic family violence, although the criterion does not contain quite an adequate terminology for what is the reason for the development of a dedicated standard. In cases of other (non-economic) types of domestic violence and their combinations, the monetary quantification of damages is significantly impeded, which can be alleviated by consulting the case law. However, what is more important than that is a proper understanding of the pecuniary damage, which should be understood as an *indicator* of possible consequences, and not as a consequence itself, because it can be psychic and ultimately deadly for the victim. Because of that, the *criteria for determining damage (D)* should be considered in the function of *matrices for determining consequences (C)* – Table 6, because the Standard contains the description for defined quantified consequences, which also contains the monetary amount of the equivalent non-monetary effect on the protected value (*Standard: Appendix NJ, Table NJ.4*).

Criticality (Cr) is a measure of the value, that is, of the protected value, i.e. its sensitivity to the effects of the harmful event. The importance of the victim’s protected value in the form of the existence of two underage children, that is, its sensitivity to the effects of a harmful event that lasts 10 months apparently without the intention of the suspect to eliminate or mitigate it, in the volume of 33.33% of the monthly income of the victim, as well as the filing of a criminal complaint, indicate that the victim was severely damaged by the crime. The above stated fact should be compared with the criterion for *determining the criticality (K)*, which is shown in the following table.

Table 5: Table Nj. 2 - Criteria for determining criticality (Cr) (Standard: Attachment NJ, Table NJ.2.)

Criticality (Cr)		Description of criticality
Degree of criticality	Size of criticality	
1	Very big	The threat to the protected values, resulting in a complete interruption of functioning.
2	Big	The threat to the protected values, resulting to a serious disruption of functioning.
3	Medium	The threat to the protected values ... which allows functionality with increased efforts and additional resources.
4	Small	The threat to the protected values ... due to which disruptions are possible in the process of work.
5	Minimal	The threat of the protected values ... due to which there are problems in functioning that are solved in action, with regular activities and resources.

Comparing the reported data on the consequences of family violence with the criterion for determining the criticality in the previous table, we have a criticality description corresponding to the lowest degree “2” and the criticality size “large”. It is obvious that Standard is terminologically not adequate to the needs of assessing the risk of domestic violence, therefore there is a need to develop a standard that is intended for that assessment. In addition, as in the case of damage, criticality criteria (*Criteria for determining the criticality (Cr)*) are also crucial to be considered in the context of the *Matrix for determining the consequences (P)* - Table 6.

Table 6: Table NJ.3 - Matrix for consequences (C) (Standard: Attachment NJ, Table NJ.3)

Criticality (Cr)		Very big	Big	Medium	Small	Minimal
Damage (D)		1	2	3	4	5
Very small	1	3	2	1	1	1
Small	2	4	3	2	2	1
Medium	3	5	4	3	2	2
Big	4	5	4	3	3	3
Very big	5	5	5	4	3	3

The carried out analysis determined the consequence of the risk of domestic violence in the particular case with value “5”. According to the *Criteria for description of consequences (C)* (Standard: Attachment NJ, Table NJ.4), the consequences of risks that are quantified by size “5” are considered “catastrophic”. Determining the probability (incredible = 2) and the consequences (catastrophic = 5) of the risky event, the conditions for determining the level of risk of domestic violence in a specific (reported) case have been created, which is determined according to the following expression:

$$RL = P \# C$$

Therefore, the level of risk is a product of the degree of probability and degree of consequences (Appendix O, Table O.2).

Table 7: Table O.2 - Matrix for determining the level of risk
(Standard: Attachment O, Table O.2)

Consequences		Minimal	Small	Moderate	Serious	Catastrophic
Probability		1	2	3	4	5
Impossible	1	1	2	3	4	5
Incredible	2	2	4	6	8	10
Probable	3	3	6	9	12	15
Almost certain	4	4	8	12	16	20
For sure	5	5	10	15	20	25

From the previous table, it is obvious that the combination of probability determined by “incredible = 2” and “catastrophic = 5” implies the level of risk of domestic violence in a particular case expressed in size “10”. The established level of risk should be ranked according to the degree and size in accordance with the *Criteria for determining the level of risk* (Standard: Attachment P, Table P.1), see the following table.

EVALUATING THE RISK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE USING SEMI-QUANTITATIVE METHODS AND RISK TREATMENT

Unforeseen by Law, but recommended methods of semi-quantitative analysis from the Standard, such as *matrices of probability and consequences*, include the obligation to classify risks into categories, and then determine which risks are acceptable and which are not.

Table 9: Table P.1 - Criteria for determining the risk category
(Standard: Attachment P, Table P.1)

Category		Size of risk	Level of risk
5	Fifth	Very small, negligible	1 and 2
4	Fourth	Small	3, 4 and 5
3	Third	Moderately big	6, 8 and 9
2	Second	Big risk	10, 12, 15 and 16
1	First	Extremely big	20 and 25

As seen in the previous table, the category of risk of domestic violence in a particular case, which is determined according to the *Criteria for determining the risk category*, is classified into a size that is expressed as “Big”, while the risk level is “10”. This still does not show if the risk is acceptable or unacceptable.

Table 10: Table P.2 - Criteria for determining acceptability of risk
(Standard: Attachment P, Table P.2)

Risk acceptability	Level of Risk
ACCEPTABLE	1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
UNACCEPTABLE	6, 8, 9, <u>10</u> , 12, 15, 16, 20 and 25

The previous table found out that the risk of violence to the family in the particular case by size “large” and level “10” is classified as unacceptable. This has been established in relation to the risk threshold, which is provided by the Standard at “5”, as the maximum acceptable. The threshold or limit value of risk may serve risk treatment in such a way that there are no urgent measures for acceptable values, whereas for unacceptable risks there are measures. Otherwise (without quantification and risk thresholds), it is possible that, after the application of urgent measures in lower-risk cases, they may become at higher level risks (for example, use of an emergency measure may result in an increase in the aggression of the suspect of family violence).

The goal of assessing the risk of domestic violence is its prevention rather than prediction (Hart, 1998: 121–137). This requires risk treatment, as a process of adopting and implementing decisions on measures that influence the mitigation of unacceptable risks. In theory, there are four basic risk management strategies: 1) reduction, 2) transfer (transmission), 3) avoidance, and 4) risk control (Savić, Stanković, 2012: 278). The pronouncement and consistent implementation of these strategies, as well as the appropriate supervision over their implementation, substantially reduces the likelihood of the occurrence of a risky event, that is, the victim’s exposure to a possible perpetrator, and hence its vulnerability. At the same time, these measures are expected to have a positive effect on deterring the perpetrator from intent, or on reducing his motivation to repeat the violence or use it for the first time. Finally, an unacceptable risk in the analysed case should be treated before a lower, and after a higher level risk.

CONCLUSION

This work has confirmed that there is a need and a possibility to overcome the incompleteness and imprecision of qualitative risk analysis prescribed by Law in the function of assessing the risk of domestic violence. The incompleteness and imprecision are manifested in the presence of qualitative and the lack of quantitative risk indicators, as well as in the absence of risk ranking by level, especially acceptable and unacceptable. This means that the Law has not used theoretical and practical possibility of conversion of qualitative into quantitative indicators, which can be done using semi-quantitative methods of analysis, in particular a matrix of probability and consequences.

In spite of all the above, the preliminary analysis found that the Standard does not meet the needs of assessing the risk of domestic violence. Although the scope of its implementation “... in the field of security and resilience of the society ...” and it is intended (among other users) for the “public authorities”, the conclusion is reached, primarily due to inappropriate terminology (except in the case of *exposure* as criteria for determining the probability). Regarding the *vulnerability* criterion, only the formally prescribed measures for the protection of the victim appear in the analysed Standard, and not the actual state of implementation of these measures. Assessing the damage by applying the Standard, its monetary quantification is possible in cases of economic family violence. In cases of complete or prevalent non-eco-

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conomic family violence and their combinations, the monetary quantification of the damage is significantly impeded, with the possible use of the court practice of financial expression of non-material damages. In doing so, understanding of pecuniary damage is crucial, which should be understood as an indicator of possible consequences, and not as a consequence, since it can vary from psychic, through health ones, to the death of the victim. Therefore, not only *harmfulness*, but also *criticality*, as criteria for *assessing certain aspects of the consequences* of risks should be considered in the context of the criteria for determining the consequences, which contains a *monetary* amount of *equivalent non-monetary consequences* for protected values, that is, the consequences for their functionality. All this leads to the conclusion that there is a need to develop a specific standard for determining the size of the risk of domestic violence in a specific case, which has been done in some countries. Such standards may be based on semi-quantitative risk assessment methods, such as the method of risk matrices.

The practical application of this conclusion refers to the improvement of the work of competent bodies in the area of prevention of domestic violence and relevant institutions. This can be achieved by developing and applying standards to assess the specific and general risk of domestic violence. What is obtained is: 1) the immediate application of standards in relation to the factual set of the reported case of domestic violence, which would lead to risk quantification, 2) deciding of risk treatment, which would predominantly occur on the basis of quantitative sizes and less based on impressions but based on qualitative analysis, which would reduce the possibility of discretionary decision-making, and 3) the creation of quantitative bases for assessing the general risk of domestic violence in the area for which the organizational unit of the police is responsible, which would also become the obligation of its manager, which is not envisaged by the Law.

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