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THE IDEOLOGY OF “GREATER KOSOVO” IN THE VISION OF ALBANIAN NARCO-TERRORIST CLANS

Saša Mijalković, Marija Popović Mančević¹

University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies, Belgrade, Serbia

Abstract: The paper reviews the evolution of the ideology and the path of creating the Albanian state in the Balkans, from the moment when it did not exist at all (during the Ottoman Empire) until today, when Albanians live in an internationally recognized state (the Republic of Albania) and in one self-proclaimed state (the so-called “Republic of Kosovo”). In that regard, this paper is based on two theses. According to the first, the focus of the original so-called state-building ideology about the need for all Albanians to live in one state, “Greater Albania”, today is radically changed and diametrically opposed: “Kosovo Albanians” now do not want to join the Republic of Albania, but want an independent state - the so-called “Greater Kosovo”, which would include parts of the territories of central Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and Greece where Albanians live. The reason for the essential change of ideology is that the drug bosses of Albanian criminal clans that control the territory of Kosmet, and who were previously commanders of Albanian terrorist organizations, want their own “drug state”, in which they would control all social flows and enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution. The second thesis on which this paper is based is that the attack on the Albanian mafia is at the same time a blow to the so-called quasi-statehood of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, i.e. on the levers of financial power, which is the backing for political power and international support for the so-called Republic of Kosovo.

Keywords: Kosovo and Metohija, Kosovo Albanians, terrorism, organized crime, “Greater Albania”, “Greater Kosovo”.

INTRODUCTION

Although there were state-building impulses before, until the beginning of the 20th century, Albanians on the Balkan Peninsula did not have their own state. It was only in 1913 that the Principality of Albania was formed, as a consequence

¹ Corresponding author: marija.popovic@kpu.edu.rs

of making a new political map of the Balkans after the expulsion of the Ottomans, which was also argued by the invitation of the Albanians to the so-called right of the people to self-determination. Even during the creation of the Principality of Albania, *an irredentist ideology was born with the admixture of unitarism* for the creation of “Greater Albania”, in such a way that parts of other states inhabited by Albanians would secede from the motherland and join the Principality of Albania.

In the second half of the 20th century, the irredentist-unitarian ideology of the Albanians was upgraded with *the autonomous-(con)federation ideology* of the creation of the “Republic of Kosovo”. Thus, within the existing Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija would receive all the attributes of a republic member of the federation, which would facilitate its secession from the Federation.




Figure 1. Irredentist ideology of Albanian extremists in Kosovo and Metohija development

Furthermore, just before the end of the second and at the beginning of the third millennium, the Kosovo Albanians invested serious *secessionist-terrorist efforts* in the realization of the “Independent Kosovo” project. The culmination of this extremist-separatist project was the state self-proclamation of the so-called independent “Republic of Kosovo”.

However, the appetites of the bearers of this ideology were not satisfied, because the “*drug-profit*” ideology of creating a “Greater Kosovo” was born. This creation would include territories outside the administrative borders of Kosovo and Metohija where Albanians live, and it would be an independent state, even from the Republic of Albania. Thus, the drug bosses of the Albanian crim-



inal clans who control the territory of Kosmet, and who were previously the commanders of the Albanian terrorist organizations, would create their own "drug state", in which they would enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution. Those same drug bosses are now the so-called Republic of Kosovo political elite.

A REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOSOVO ALBANIANS EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY

Kosovo and Metohija are deeply rooted in a national identity, but also in the national pride and dignity of the Serbian people. The collapse of the "Serbian Empire" after the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 is one of the most painful points in Serbian history. It was not only the Serbian and Turkish armies that clashed then; both Islamic and Christian civilizations clashed. That clash of civilizations continues to this day.

The thesis about the clash of civilizations is confirmed by the bloody conflicts during the First and Second World Wars, and most of all during the 1990s, precisely in the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo and Metohija. The state-building idea of the Albanians was programmatically shaped by the formation of *the Albanian Committee in Janjina* in 1877 and *the Prizren League* in 1878, with the idea of forming a large "Albanian vilayet" within the Ottoman Empire, in which all Albanians would live together. This would imply the unification of four Ottoman provinces: Kosovo, Skadar, Janjina and Bitolj (Borožan, 1997: 390). Academician Ljubodrag Dimić evaluates this idea, known as "Greater Albania", "Natural Albania", i.e. as "Real Albania", as "a very dangerous, very aggressive idea for the Balkan people" (according to: Lazić, 2019).

An important event in the realization of the idea of the "Albanian vilayet" was the Great Albanian Uprising in 1912 against

Turkey, when the insurgents occupied a significant part of Kosovo and Metohija, the northern parts of today's Albania and a large part of today's Northern Macedonia. Forced to negotiate, Porta promised the insurgents the formation of an autonomous "Albanian vilayet". After the end of the Balkan Wars in 1912, in which the armies of the alliance of Balkan states liberated the Balkans from the Turks (the Serbian army encountered strong armed resistance from Albanian armed groups), a peace conference was held in London for territorial demarcation. In the same year, a decision was made on the formation of the Principality of Albania, which was formally done in 1913. Thus, one nation, guided by state-building ideology, created an ethnic state (Avramovski, 1989: 61–68).

However, a large number of Albanian tribes remained dissatisfied, despite the proclamation of the Principality of Albania. The reason is that the territory of the Principality included "only" half of the territory that Porta promised to the Albanian insurgents in 1912. As a result, almost half of Albanians remain living in Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and Greece. This created great dissatisfaction among Albanians, whose extremist instincts were beginning to flourish. They were first manifested as the cultivation of *an irredentist ideology*, which aimed to secede from the territories of the four states inhabited by Alba-



nians and their annexation - *unification with the Principality of Albania*. One of the most important irredentist movements was the "Kosovo People's Defense Committee" (Avramovski, 1989: 71–86). Irredentists started hostile actions against Serbia. Thus, during the withdrawal of the Serbian army in the First World War through Albania, they killed Serbian soldiers and refugees in organized armed ambushes and attacks. The goal was to weaken and even disintegrate the state of Serbia, in order for its territory to be dismembered and taken. Furthermore, during the Second World War, Albania was a protectorate of fascist Italy. Then, at least for a short time (1941–1943), the project "Greater-United Albania" came to life in part: all territories inhabited by Albanians, except parts of Greece, were placed under the rule of fascist Albania. During and immediately after the Second World War, Albanian extremists and armed gangs also committed crimes against the Serb population: they were killed, displaced, their property was confiscated or destroyed, symbols of religion and culture were destroyed (Antonijević, 2005: 157–166). After the end of the Second World War, the borders were again the same as before the war.

The extremist activities of Albanians are also characteristic in the post-war period, when several illegal organizations were founded: "Bali Kombtar", "Third Prizren League", "Legality", "National Committee for Free Kosovo", "National Movement for the Republic of Kosovo", "Kosovo Marxist and Leninist Organization", "Kosovars Alliance", "Croatian-Albanian Alliance" and others (Hasani, 1989: 209–218; Kešetović, 1988: 88–93). Most of these organizations are emigrant and extremist-fascist. They are

ideologically "fed" by Albanian national, religious and left-wing extremism, Marxist-Leninist and Enverist ideology, and Italian fascism and occupation in the Second World War (Đorđević, 1987: 180–184).

The irredentist-violent approach to the creation of "Greater Albania" had its political wing consisting of Albanians, but also certain prominent politicians of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia primarily Slovenian and Croatian (*Slovenia's lobbying for recognition of Kosovo is a surprise for Serbia*, 2018). Additional support for such a political platform was provided by the intellectual-academic community of Kosmet (primarily Albanians from the University of Pristina), which was supported by the Albanian Academy of Sciences and the Albanian University. In such a "whirlpool of irredentist currents" there emerged *autonomous-(con)federative ideology* of creating the "Republic of Kosovo" (Petkovic, 1997: 40–44; Krstić, 1994: 38–42).

The goal of the mentioned ideological current was for the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija to get all the status characteristics of a constituent republic - a member of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In that sense, first, within the constitutional changes in 1968, the word "Metohija", a symbol of Serbianness, but also of Christianity, was removed from the name of the province. The goal was to associate the name of the province "Kosovo" with the Kosovo province from the time of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, within the constitutional changes in 1971, the name "Shiptar", which was also used by Albanians in Albania, was changed to the name "Albanian" (Lukovic, according to Garabedjan, 2007: 130). Additional impetus to the irredentist ideology is given



by the constitutional changes from 1974, which equate the rights of both autonomous provinces with the rights of republics (enactment of constitutions and laws and direct participation in federal bodies), thus gaining the prerogatives of statehood. Without the consent of the provinces, the constitutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia cannot be changed. In addition, the province believes that its new status implies the right to self-determination until secession, which in political circles was considered the exclusive right of the member republics. In this regard, Albanian politicians held a referendum in 1991, demanding independence, declaring Kosovo a republic. Fortunately, international recognition came only from the Republic of Albania. Furthermore, during the war in Yugoslavia (1991-1995), parallel Albanian institutions were formed in Kosmet and passive resistance was waged against the Republic of Serbia, which Serbia considered as illegal actions, which took place outside the legal order of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Also, all the time, there have been attempts to internationalize the problem, in which Albanians would be portrayed as victims of the genocide of the Serbian state (Garabedjan, 2007: 130–132, 134–138). This phase in the development of the Albanian irredentist ideology lasted until 1999, when there was an escalation of terrorism by Albanian extremists and military aggression against Yugoslavia and Serbia.

The peak in the realization of the Albanian irredentist ideology was reached in 1999, when the terrorism of Albanian extremists escalated. Terrorist activities took on massive proportions, to the extent that they had the characteristics of an armed rebellion against the constitutional order and security of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yu-

goslavia. Through the international factor, and without international legal bases provided by the authorized bodies of the United Nations, a reason was created for the alleged "humanitarian intervention" against the sovereign Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, i.e. against the Republic of Serbia, for allegedly bringing the Albanian national minority into a situation of physical extermination (so-called humanitarian catastrophe). Justifying this event, it was assessed as "illegal, but legitimate: illegal because it is not based on the decision of the United Nations Security Council; legitimate, because all diplomatic efforts to solve the problem of Kosovo Albanians who have long been under repression by the Serbian regime have been exhausted" (Independent International Commission on Kosovo: The Kosovo Report, 1/21/2015).

After two and a half months of NATO aggression, a Military Technical Agreement was signed on June 9th between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, on the one hand, and the International Security Assistance Force - KFOR under the auspices of the United Nations, on the other (Stevanović, 2015). This ended the agony of NATO aggression against the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Pavlović et al, 2012: 362–363). The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which deployed international security forces in Kosmet, after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army and Serbian police.

Furthermore, at the end of 1999 and during 2000, there was a "spillover" of terrorism from Kosovo and Metohija to the territories of central Serbia (the so-called Presevo Valley - Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja) and to northwestern Northern Macedonia. The new terrorist or-



ganizations, in Serbia "Liberation Army of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja – LAPBM", and in Northern Macedonia "Liberation People's Army – LPA" and "Albanian National Army – ANA" did not differ in any way from the terrorist Liberation Army of Kosovo. Fortunately, with the quick and skilful actions of the security forces of Serbia and Northern Macedonia, the violence subsided. However, the idea of annexing parts of the territory of Serbia and Northern Macedonia to Kosovo has not disappeared (see: Stevanović, Mijalković, Subošić & Mlađan, 2012: 1701–1717).

On the other side, there has been persistent and frequent public rhetoric among Albanians that they have no territorial claims to the neighboring countries. There has been some further arguments that the danger of the alleged "Greater Albania" scheme, skillfully propagated by the Slav and Greek propaganda machinery and even by some academic and government circles in the West, is to a certain extent exacerbated and helped to demonize and morally downgrade the Albanian question and that exaggerated the risk emanating from the alleged "Greater Albania" (Hilaj, 2013: 412). Edi Rama, the Prime Minister of Albania wrote on his twitter once that "Greater Albania" is "Serbian nightmare, not Albanian project" (Rama, 2014).

After NATO bombings of 1999, "Greater Kosovo" indeed came to prominence over the ideology of the "Greater Albania" both rhetorically and practically, as it coincided with an opinion of the Kosovo public that conditions have been created for the independence of Kosovo. According to the official United Nations Development Program data from 2007, only 3% of Kosovo Albanians considered the unification of Kosovo with Al-

bania a good solution to Kosovo's status, while as many as 96% of Kosovo Albanians considered independence to be the best and most prosperous solution for Kosovo, within the then borders (*Early Warning Report Kosovo - Report No. 17*, 2007: 18).

The escalation of events occurred on February 17th, 2008, when the so-called "Republic of Kosovo" self-proclaimed as an independent state of the Kosovo Albanians. The event prompted Albanians to believe that they had "put a stamp" on the creation of a new Albanian state. An additional incentive was that the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion in 2010, according to which "it was not forbidden to declare Kosovo's independence". At the same time, it does not imply the right of Kosovo to do so, or the right of Kosovo to secede from Serbia (Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion, Europe Report N° 206, August 26th, 2010).

Despite that, the degree of radicalism and violent extremism of Kosmet Albanians is growing day by day, and this problem exceeds the limits of the so-called Republic of Kosovo. According to the UNDP studies in Kosovo in 2017, 316 residents of Kosmet joined armed formations in Syria. Of that, 245 were men, 44 women and 27 children. At that time, about 127 of them returned to Kosovo from the world's battlefields. The results of a UNDP survey indicate that about a third of Kosmet residents believe that a larger number of Kosovo residents are influenced by extreme or radical forms of Islam, while about a quarter believe that radical groups have an influence in Kosovo (*Public Pulse Analysis on Prevention of Violent Extremism in Kosovo*, 2017: 6–8; *Community Level Recommendations for Preventing Violent Extrem-*



ism in Kosovo, 2017: 8). Even today, in 2020, Kosovo has the highest per capita number of Islamist returning foreign fighters in Europe, facing challenges to reintegrate approximately 242 Kosovo nationals who have returned from fighting with the ISIS (Jensen, 2020).

This is a confirmation of the thesis that the terrorism of Albanian extremists is at the same time religiously (radically-Islamistically) motivated. Hence the urge to "kill the Serbian-Christian civilization": for genocide, urbicide, but also for culturicide (See: Mijalković, Popović, 2016: 140–148; Mijalković, Amidžić, 2012: 367–386). The consequence is that today there are almost no Serbs and non-Albanians in Kosmet: the population of Kosmet is about 1.8 million people. Regarding the ethnic structure of Kosovo and Metohija, there are no precise data, but it is estimated, according to the last census from 2011, that the demographic structure in Kosovo consists of Albanians 92.9%, Bosnians 1.6%, Serbs 1.5%, Turks 1.1%, Ashkalis 0.9%, Egyptians 0.7%, Goranis 0.6%, Romanis 0.5%, other/unspecified 0.2% (The World Factbook, June 2020). For comparison, in 1948, there were 727,820 inhabitants in Kosmet, and the national structure was as follows: 68% Albanians; 24% Serbs and 8% members of other ethnic groups; in 1981, there were 1,584,558 inhabitants

in Kosmet, and the national structure was as follows: 78% Albanians; 13% of Serbs and 9% of members of other ethnic groups (Pavlović, Marković, 2006: 233). So it is clear that today Serbs are a minority that does not enjoy freedom of movement, does not enjoy the right to work and lives in fear of attack in enclaves protected by international security forces (*The Kosovo Report: Conflict – International Response – Lessons Learned*²⁰⁰⁰, 260–261).

In addition, the efforts of the so-called political leadership of Kosovo for the reception of the so-called Republic of Kosovo to the United Nations and to the specialized educational, scientific and cultural agencies of this organization are evident, primarily to the UNESCO and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), as well as to the Council of Europe. Unfortunately, Kosovo has become a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (*Serbia and Kosovo: The Path to Normalisation – Europe Report N°223*, 2013: 6). This would further operationalize the so-called statehood and strengthen Kosovo's international legitimacy. However, despite the self-proclamation of the so-called "Independent Republic of Kosovo", the appetites of certain extremist-irredentist-separatist currents do not calm down.

"GREATER KOSOVO" AS A STATE OF NARCO-TERRORISTS

From the presented review of the evolution of Albanian irredentist ideology, it is clear that the idea and vision of today's "Kosovo" is very different from the original idea of creating an Albanian state in the Balkans: unlike state-building ideals that would create a single state of Albani-

ans, the idea and vision of the creation of a "private state" is evident today (in addition to the existing Republic of Albania) in which several drug bosses would rule Kosmet, without fear of criminal prosecution for crimes they once committed, are committing and are about to



commit. The authors of some previous research also conclude that "a large part of political life in Kosovo and Metohija today has criminal background, both in terms of dubious sources of funding and in terms of the intertwining of political structures with criminal gangs, especially at the local level" (Đurić, 2011: 135). The evolution of motives from "state-building" to "drug-profiteering" is evident, with the criminalization of the highest state functions.

Tamara Makarenko finds in her research from 2004 that "the most illustrative nexus between a criminal and terrorist group is the relationship between the Albanian mafia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the Kosovo conflict" (Makarenko, 2004: 132). She also points out that when afterwards in 1997 KLA was established as a liberation movement to seek an independent state from Serbia, a very specific relationship developed between the political wing of the KLA (the Kosovo National Front (KLF)) and Albanian criminal groups to smuggle heroin (Ibid). Other scholars also claim in their research that the close link between heroin trafficking, arms smuggling and financing of the KLA has been documented in different countries, at different levels, and by several intelligence reports and journalistic sources (Strazzari, 2008: 158).

So, it is clear that in Kosovo and Metohija certain connections between organized crime and terrorism have been established for years, in the form of narco-terrorism. There are two dominant types of these connections: the organized criminal activity of Kosovo Albanians took on first European and then world proportions, which created an informal center of financial power from the so-called Albanian mafia. This "dirty mon-

ey" was used precisely for financing and arming Albanian terrorist organizations and their activities, as well as for smuggling foreign terrorists and mercenaries to the territory of Kosmet. Although it is not terrorism in the narrower sense of the word, part of the terrorist strategy of creating "Independent Kosovo" was the purchase of Serbian houses and property, privatization of Serbian companies in Kosovo and Metohija, corruption of some world politicians and the representatives of international organizations, also by using dirty money.

In addition, Albanian criminal organizations abused the aspirations of Kosovo Albanians for Kosovo's independence and formed terrorist organizations that carried out mass terrorist attacks throughout Kosmet in 1999. In the early 1990s, Albanians formed a few terrorist organizations: the "National Movement of Kosovo", the "National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo" and the "Kosovo Liberation Army". Shortly afterwards, there were mass terrorist attacks throughout Kosmet. It is interesting that after the NATO aggression on Yugoslavia and Serbia, in the presence of the so-called international security forces, new terrorist organizations are being formed in Serbia and Northern Macedonia: "National Liberation Army", "Eastern Kosovo Liberation Army", "Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja Liberation Army", "Plav and Gusinje Liberation Army" and "Albanian National Army". At the same time, the political leadership of terrorist organizations is concentrated in certain legally and illegally established political parties (primarily from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija and the Republic of Albania), and above all in the Revolutionary Party of Albanians, the National Committee for Defense and Liberation of Albanian Territories, The Front for



the National Unification of Albanians, the National Movement of Kosovo, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, as well as in the parties from southern Serbia: Party for Democratic Progress, Democratic Party of Albanians and in the Democratic Union for the Valley (Mijalković, Đinović, 2008: 167–192).

Today, it is known that the territory of Kosovo and Metohija is the source and transit area where numerous Albanian criminal clans operate, of which the most important are certainly *the Drenica clan*, which operates in Pristina, in the Drenica Valley and in northwestern Kosmet and is under the control of Hashim Thaci – the former leader of the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army, now a high-ranking politician and state official; *The Metohija (Dukadjini) clan* operates in the wider vicinity of Peja, Decani and Gjakova, which is under the control of Ramush Haradinaj; and *the Lab clan*, which operates in the vicinity of Gnjilan, Vitina and Kacanik and is under the control of Remi Mustafa (*Albanian terrorism and organized crime in Kosovo and Metohija*, 2003: 10). Criminal clans in Kosovo and Metohija are responsible for the production and distribution of marijuana and for the distribution of heroin to the countries of the region and to Central and Western Europe (*Threat Assessment of Serious and Organized Crime (public version)*, 2015: 23–33; *SOCTA 2017 - European Union Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, 2017: 35–38), and the situation is similar with arms smuggling (*Strategic Assessment of Public Safety (public version)*, 2015: 41–45). All this, as well as the fact that Albanian drug cartels are significantly funded by extremist and terrorist organizations in Kosovo and Metohija, was known to even the most powerful security services

in the world in 1990s (*Albanian Terrorism and Organized Crime in Kosovo and Metohija*, 2003; Ćirić, 2008: 193–215).

All this is well known to the international community, primarily to the scientific and professional public. The following quote confirms that descriptively:

„Unlike Bosnia, where a certain military balance between ethnic groups has been preserved, Kosmet has been handed over to the absolute power of the Albanians under the auspices of NATO. It ends in a horrific ethnic cleansing whose victims were the Serb and non-Albanian populations of the province. Thus, the protectorate did not create a multiethnic democracy, but a dwarf state full of malice and revenge. According to the recognition of the commander of the NATO joint forces in Europe, General Wesley Clark, the basic problems in Kosmet are organized crime and ethnic cleansing. Extremists rule in Kosmet! KFOR did not heed the persistent calls of the Albanian intelligentsia to take strict measures against members of Hashim Thaci's army. The highest UN officials describe the situation in Kosmet as horrible and chaotic, where various, often private structures that have power operate. The province has turned into a paradise for mafia organizations of various kinds, which not only control the given region, villages and cities, but often also fight among themselves. Political observers note that almost half of the heroin coming to the United States and Western Europe is delivered by Kosovo's criminal Albanian groups, which control the entire narcotics market in the Balkans. It is estimated that about 40% of all drug deliveries in Europe come through Hashim Thaci's people. The monthly income of Kosovo Albanians from drug deliveries is between 80 and 120 million US dol-



lars. Thanks to the fact that the border is practically not guarded, as well as the lack of law enforcement in Kosmet, apart from the drug business, an illegal trade in weapons, people and human organs also flourishes" (Garabedjan, 2007: 141). In the stated conditions of lawlessness and autocracy, as well as the tolerance of the international community, the conditions are ideal for the development of the "drug industry", but also other transnational criminal activities of the Albanian mafia from Kosovo and Metohija. The current position of the highest statesmen is being used by drug bosses to terrorize the population and to eliminate competition. In addition, the possibility of being held criminally responsible for crimes is minimal, i.e. almost non-existent. However, the question arises: how long will such a state last and how to prolong it? That is why great efforts are

being made for the international recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. In addition, it goes a step further and develops a new irredentist ideology: the ideology of "Greater Kosovo". On April 24th, 2020, the Specialist Prosecutor's Office for Kosovo filed a ten-count Indictment with the Kosovo Specialist Chambers for the Court's consideration, charging Hashim Thaci, Kadri Veseli and others with a range of crimes against humanity and war crimes. They are charged suspected to be criminally responsible for nearly 100 murders of Kosovo Albanian, Serb, Roma, and other ethnicities (Kosovo Specialist Chambers & Specialist Prosecutor's Office, Press Statement, 24 June 2020), which demonstrates that now all the international community must be fully aware of the fact who the political elites are in the so-called Republic of Kosovo.

DISCUSSION

Despite the polarization of the professional and scientific public's perception of the issue of the co-called "Republic of Kosovo", there are certain conclusions derived from this paper that can be verified and confirmed in numerous sources. The creation of the "Republic of Kosovo" is a complex undertaking, consisting of several components and this research has identified five basic ones.

The first is *an ideological platform*, which was created during the Ottoman Empire, whose vision is the coexistence of all Albanians in a common - independent state in the Balkans. Ideology has evolved over time, ranging from a single state-building (Albania and "Greater Albania") to the creation of a parallel internationally recognized (drug-profit)

Albanian state ruled by drug cartels in the "suits" of Democratic statesmen (Republic of Kosovo). The second is *the political logistics*, both the "political elites" from Albania, Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija, as well as the politicians from other Yugoslav republics who provided assistance and support to Kosovo Albanians in building their own state. The third is *the terrorist activity* of numerous Albanian terrorist organizations and movements, mostly in the late 1990s, after they metamorphosed into liberation movement. The fourth is *the lobbying logistics* of some individuals from foreign governments, international organizations, multinational companies that had an interest in advocating for Kosovo's independence. Finally, the



fifth is the inevitable *mafia activities* of numerous Albanian criminal organizations and groups that financed terrorist organizations and their actions, as well as the entire political and lobbying component, with dirty money, mostly acquired through drug crime.

In the presented structure of the realization of the Albanian irredentist ideology, the oldest is the ideological platform, while the functioning of the presented structure is not possible without the Albanian mafia. It is clear that the Albanian mafia has been the generator and financier of all extremist events in the last two decades. It created money with which terrorist organizations were equipped and financed, from which new "bosses" and "soldiers" of the Albanian mafia were later recruited. Some of them are today the political elite, which creates conditions for further development of the Albanian mafia. This created a vicious circle of the overflow of organized crime into terrorism, and *vice versa*. That is why the "Republic of Kosovo" is considered a narco-terrorist state.

The ambitions of organized crime have a growing trend of insatiability. It means, above all, strengthening one's own position within the newly created so-called state, to strengthen the position of the so-called state in the international community, but also to new territorial claims to parts of the territories inhabited by Albanians. The latter is popular from the aspect of gaining the general support of Albanians for leading the so-called national and international policies of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, and this primarily in order to strengthen the established government, and ensure immunity from criminal prosecution of government actors.

Based on the presented facts, general recommendations for the security policy of the Republic of Serbia regarding the "Kosovo issue" can be made. First, the Republic of Serbia must improve the control mechanisms of all neuralgic points on its territory where escalation of politically motivated violence is possible. It is about the geospace of the so-called Presevo Valley (Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja) and Raska area. In addition, the security services of the Republic of Serbia should be involved, through international security cooperation, in the control of extremist movements and organizations in the surrounding countries. The Republic of Serbia should seriously dedicate itself to the intensified control of the relations between criminal and terrorist organizations, and this control should be carried out in the area of the previously mentioned neuralgic points in Serbia and in the surrounding area. It is especially worrying that cooperation between the Albanian mafia and irredentists in the Presevo Valley and in the Raska area (Islamists and the so-called Bosniak and Turkish mafia) is possible in the future as well. In that sense, it is necessary to improve international intelligence and police cooperation, primarily with Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and Greece. Among the activities that aim to prevent giving legitimacy to the so-called Republic of Kosovo, it is necessary to intensify international efforts to prevent the formation of the so-called Kosovo Armed Forces. The reasons are not only the security of the Republic of Serbia (the newly formed Kosovo Army could not seriously threaten Serbia, but would instill insecurity in Serbs and non-Albanians in Kosmet), but also the prevention of giving statehood to the so-called Republic of Kosovo. This includes perseverance in efforts to achieve



the survival of the so-called KLA War Crimes Court in Kosovo and Metohija, because that is one of the main remaining ways to reveal the truth about the crimes of the Albanian extremists against Serbs and non-Albanians in Kosmet. In the domain of stopping the so-called Kosovo state in gaining international credibility, the Republic of Serbia must make serious efforts to prevent diplomatic and other international (economic, cultural, sports, tourism, etc.) activities of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, especially when it comes to its efforts to become a member of international organizations (the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the UNESCO, the FIFA, the FIBA, the Red Cross, the Interpol, the Europol, the Eurojust, etc). Control of financial resources used in privatization procedures of public companies and property, the purchase of property and residential and business facilities is also extremely important, in order to prevent the participation of Albanian "dirty" drug profits in investment and

privatization procedures in the Republic of Serbia. This entails the improvement of mechanisms for controlling the international movement of vehicles, import and export of oil, cigarettes and other excise goods, as well as migration control, in order to prevent the smuggling of stolen vehicles, smuggling of excise goods, smuggling of migrants and human trafficking, which are the dominant crime businesses of the Albanian mafia. It is especially important to improve the control of international and domestic trade of precursors and other chemicals used in the production of the so-called designer (synthetic) drugs. Within the public sector, especially within the national security system, it is necessary to improve the mechanisms for controlling corruption, negligent work and abuse of office. Finally, a contribution is expected from the scientific community, which through research activities should spread the truth about Kosovo and Metohija and its quasi-statehood.

CONCLUSION

In the vision of the so-called Republic of Kosovo state leadership, the "Greater Albania" ideology is not at the top priorities list. However, the state leadership of the so-called Republic of Kosovo has claims to the parts of the territory of Serbia (Presevo Valley and parts of the Raska region), western and northern parts of Northern Macedonia, southern and eastern parts of Montenegro, and possibly northwestern parts of Greece. This ambition was expressed in 1999 and 2000, by activating terrorist organizations in the Presevo Valley and northwestern Northern Macedonia. Although the goal was not achieved then,

the idea is still alive and its realization will surely be seriously worked on. Thus, the territories inhabited by Albanians, which the Ottoman Porte promised to the Albanian insurgents in Kosovo and Metohija in 1912, would finally become integral parts of the great Albanian state. But, this time, it would not be the realization of the idea of "Greater Albania", but of "Greater Kosovo", which before that gained internationally recognized independence and has full internal sovereignty.

The huge danger lies in the fact that the so-called "Greater Kosovo" was ruled by



the largest political parties, which were the political wings of terrorist organizations, and which were founded by drug clans. In such an environment, the heads of the mafia and former members of terrorist organizations are (or may have chance to be) in power. The government will pass laws and administer selective justice, in which there will be no truth and mercy for Serbs, as well as no criminal liability for terrorists and members of criminal clans. Therefore, the Republic of Serbia has a national interest in restoring and strengthening the violated territorial integrity and sovereignty over Kosovo and Metohija.

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